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1 Introduction
Planning for retirement and choosing when to retire are important decisions for
most people. Workers pay Social Security (SS henceforth) contributions from
their earnings,1 save and invest in retirement accounts, and choose whether to
claim early or delay claiming retirement benefits beyond the normal retirement
age.
There is strong evidence that the pension and and tax systems affect retirement
behavior.2 Wedges, or implicit distortions in SS benefits and labor income taxes,
affect labor supply, both through daily work hours—the intensive margin—and
through the timing of retirement—the extensive margin. The value of retirement
pensions and post-tax retirement savings determines consumption after retirement.
In turn, retirement behavior affects the income distribution and the duration of
retirement, which are critical inputs into the design of the SS and tax system.
This paper aims to assess the effect of endogenous retirement for the optimal
design of social insurance over the life cycle. Since the seminal Mirrlees (1971)
income taxation model, most models in optimal tax theory assume that retirement
is an exogenous date instead of an endogenous labor supply decision. Progress has
been made in specific economies with a disability shock (cf. Diamond and Mirrlees
(1978) and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006)) or a permanent wage shock at birth in a
static setting (cf. Michau (2014) and Shourideh and Troshkin (2015)). In realistic
life cycle settings where wage risk gradually resolves over time, the implications
of endogenous retirement for the structure of optimal retirement policies are yet
to be understood.
This paper’s central question is the following: How does the endogeneity of
retirement affect the optimal design of social security and taxes? In other words,
how should the government choose consumption, work hours, and the retirement
age to provide wage insurance over the life cycle, and through what policy instru-
ments? First, I analytically derive optimal history-dependent policies and describe
the economic forces that shape retirement distortions over the life cycle. Second,
I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and quantify the magnitude, evolution,
and welfare gains from optimal policies. Third, I show that optimal policies can be
implemented by retirement benefits akin to the U.S. SS system. Finally, I explore
policy recommendations for simple linear policies that condition on the retirement
age.
1In the US, employers also pay the SS portion of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA) tax of 6.2% of gross compensation.
2cf. Gruber and Wise (1998, 2002).
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In the life cycle model, workers adjust their labor supply through work hours
and the timing of retirement. Individuals live from ages 25 to 80, work, consume,
and choose when to retire. During work years, labor income is the product of
intensive labor supply and wage or productivity, evolving as a Markov process.
A fixed utility cost of staying in the labor market creates non-convexities in the
disutility of labor. This fixed cost incorporates some essential characteristics of
retirement decisions. First, workers adjust their work hours until they irreversibly
exit the labor force, with a drop in work hours to zero. Second, when productivity
is public information, highly productive agents efficiently retire later than lowly
productive agents. Third, there is an option value of waiting for higher wages
before retirement. This option value decreases with age as the value of waiting for
higher wages vanishes in old-age.
The government chooses consumption, work hours, and retirement age in order
to maximize social welfare. As in the standard Mirrlees (1971) model, individual
productivity and labor effort are privately observed by the workers. Besides, the
fixed utility cost of staying in the labor market depends on productivity and is
unobserved by the government. Therefore, the government’s goal is to design a
dynamic mechanism that is incentive-compatible. This mechanism leads to im-
plicit taxes and subsidies, or "wedges" that summarize the distortions in the con-
strained efficient allocations. With endogenous retirement, the retirement, labor,
and savings wedges interact in nontrivial ways. On the one hand, a positive labor
wedge will distort both work hours and the retirement age downwards. On the
other hand, a positive savings wedge will discourage retirement savings and delay
retirement. Therefore, the optimal retirement wedge’s first goal is to counterbal-
ance the indirect distortions to retirement decisions from the labor and savings
wedges. I introduce the net retirement wedge as the net distortion on retirement
that filters out the effects of labor and savings distortions. The second goal is
to redistribute and insure against wage shocks while accounting for the disparate
impact of continued work on the welfare of low wage and high wage workers.
When the fixed cost of work is increasing in wage, continued work has a pos-
itive redistributive and insurance value. It is then optimal to incentivize delayed
retirement beyond merely countering the indirect distortions to retirement deci-
sions from the labor and savings wedges. As a result, the net retirement wedge
gives stronger incentives for delayed retirement with age. The optimal retirement
wedge inherits the rate of persistence from the wage shocks. The relative size of
the fixed cost of work for high wage and low wage workers determines the direc-
tion of the net retirement wedge. Finally, the insurance and redistributive value
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of endogenous retirement and the size of labor distortions amplify the level of the
net retirement wedge.
This paper proposes two implementations of the optimal allocations: The first
implementation is through retirement benefits that share similar features with
many public pension programs worldwide. These retirement benefits are con-
tingent on the history of income until retirement. When incentivizing delayed
retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role, the benefits are pro-
gressive in lifetime incomes. Also, the social insurance system is always actuarially
more favorable to low earners than high earners, and more so when incentivizing
delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role. The second
implementation is through a simple SS program similar to the US Old-Age, Sur-
vivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. In particular, a deferral rate
adjusts benefits such that the private and public option values of continued work
equalize at the second-best retirement age.
I calibrate the model to a baseline U.S. economy with a rich representation
of the status quo SS and tax systems. Then, I discuss the properties of optimal
policies for different assumptions on the relative size of the fixed cost of work for
high wage and low wage workers. When continued work has a positive redistribu-
tive and insurance role, the net retirement wedge is negative and decreases with
age, i.e., the planner provides stronger delayed retirement incentives with age. A
simple combination of retirement benefits that are linear in lifetime incomes and
that increase with retirement age, along with age-dependent linear taxes, achieves
almost the entire welfare gains from the constrained efficient allocations in my
calibrated simulations.
Related Literature An extensive empirical literature documents the relation-
ship between retirement behavior and tax and SS systems around the world. Gru-
ber and Wise (1998), Gruber and Wise (2002), and their accompanying volumes of
comparative studies document that, over much of the second half of the 20th cen-
tury, disincentives to continue working created a trend towards early retirement.
This trend has shown signs of reversal in the mid-2000s because of longevity,
gender composition, social norms, SS and tax reforms, and other factors.
This paper builds on the insights of the early non-linear income taxation lit-
erature. Mirrlees (1971) develops the theory and optimal tax formulas that Saez
(2001) links to estimated elasticities. Albanesi and Sleet (2006) develop a dynamic
Mirrlees model and focus on implementing the optimal allocations with a restricted
set of instruments. The subsequent literature develops the dynamic Mirrlees model
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with persistent productivity shocks (Farhi and Werning (2013)) and focuses on the
evolution of the labor wedge. Golosov et al. (2016) disentangle the motives of
insurance and redistribution. Stantcheva (2017) incorporates endogenous human
capital acquisition.3 A comprehensive survey of the dynamic taxation literature
can be found in Golosov and Tsyvinski (2015) and Stantcheva (2020). These pa-
pers assume an exogenous retirement age and find that the labor wedge should
increase with age and that linear history-independent but age-dependent taxes are
close to optimal. Three sets of results distinguish this paper and contribute to the
dynamic taxation literature. First, with endogenous retirement, the retirement
wedge plays important insurance and actuarial roles that are not present with
exogenous retirement. Second, the labor wedge is slightly hump-shaped rather
than increasing in old age. Third, retirement benefits that are increasing with
retirement age are needed in addition to the age-dependent linear taxes to achieve
welfare gains close to those from the constrained efficient allocations. Crucially,
these retirement benefits are history-dependent but are linear in lifetime incomes.
My analysis of the Mirrlees optimal policies sheds new light on the quantita-
tive results of complementary literature on the parametric optimization of social
insurance. Huggett and Parra (2010) study the level of insurance provided by the
US SS and tax system in a model with a fixed retirement age. They quantitatively
find that SS benefits that are linear or progressive in lifetime income are equally
as desirable under the status quo tax system. Both policies outperform a radical
reform that replaces the social insurance system with a tax on lifetime income.
However, as the authors acknowledge, their analysis cannot identify the policies
that come close to achieving the maximal welfare gains. This paper shows that re-
tirement benefits that are linear in lifetime incomes, combined with age-dependent
linear taxes, can achieve the bulk of the maximal welfare gains for the simulations
studied. Crucially, this paper emphasizes the importance of actuarial adjustment
of retirement benefits with retirement age if one accounts for endogenous retire-
ment. In a model with exogenous retirement but an increasing elasticity of labor
supply parameter, Karabarbounis (2016) finds that the optimal labor income tax,
within the class of the Heathcote et al. (2014) tax function, is hump-shaped in
age.
The first analysis of retirement and optimal taxation comes from Diamond and
Mirrlees (1978). In their framework, workers are subject to disability shocks (as
subsequently in Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006)). All able workers choose the same
retirement age and share the same productivity at any given age. Hence, their
3Makris and Pavan (2017) investigate the effects of learning-by-doing on optimal taxes.
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retirement decisions do not interact with the income distribution. Also, Diamond
and Mirrlees (1978) do not allow for an intensive margin of labor supply. Other
papers study optimal taxation with an extensive margin of labor supply in a static
framework (Saez (2002), Jacquet et al. (2013), Gomes et al. (2017), Rothschild
and Scheuer (2013)).
Recent literature has analyzed optimal tax and retirement benefits and the
timing of retirement. Michau (2014), Cremer et al. (2004), Choné and Laroque
(2014), and Shourideh and Troshkin (2015) introduce the retirement margin in
the analysis of optimal tax and retirement benefit systems. In these papers, a
permanent shock deterministically pins down the whole history of productivity,
as in a static setting. Shourideh and Troshkin (2015) find that when the fixed
cost of work increases in wages, the static retirement wedge incentivizes delayed
retirement. This paper highlights novel contributions to this literature. These
include the stronger incentives for delayed retirement as workers age, the insurance
and actuarial roles of the retirement wedge, the two proposed implementations,
and ensuing policy recommendations for simple policies.
Other papers study aspects of retirement, taxation, and social security design
with essential differences from the current paper. Nishiyama and Smetters (2007)
and Hosseini and Shourideh (2019) study the privatization and funding of social
security in overlapping generation economies. Moser and Olea de Souza e Silva
(2019) study the optimal design of social security with presented-bias individuals.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the optimal design of intragenera-
tional insurance with rational retirement as an endogenous labor supply decision.
I extend the results to economies with home production and individuals with an
uncertain lifetime correlated with income. More work is needed to fully understand
the determinants of labor supply in old age (marital status, social norms, health,
liquidity constraints) and to formulate comprehensive Social Security reform.
The following sections are structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the life cycle
model of endogenous retirement and highlights the retirement decision features in
the full information benchmark. Section 3 develops a recursive formulation of the
second-best planning problem. Section 4 determines the optimal retirement poli-
cies and describes the results. Section 5 presents the numerical analysis. Section
6 contains two implementations of optimal policies and policy recommendations
for simpler policies. Section 7 discusses modeling assumptions and presents two
extensions of the canonical model. Section 8 concludes. All major proofs are
relegated in Appendix A. Computational Appendix B. contains some additional
proofs and figures of the numerical analysis.
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2 A Life cycle Model of Endogenous Retirement
In this section, I describe an economy in which workers are ex-ante heterogeneous
in productivity, experience idiosyncratic productivity shocks over their lifetime,
and adjust their labor supply through flexible working hours and the timing of
their retirement.
Productivity, Technology, and Preferences Consider a continuous-time econ-
omy populated by a continuum of agents who live until age T . At each time t,
each agent privately observes the realization of his current labor productivity
θt ∈ (0,+∞). Agents provide lt ≥ 0 units of labor at time t at a wage rate equal
to their productivity and earn gross income yt = θtlt.
At time t = 0, initial productivity θ0 ∈ (0,+∞) is drawn from a distribution
F with density f . A standard Brownian Motion B = {Bt,Ft; 0 ≤ t ≤ T} on
(Ω,F ,P) drives the productivity shocks in future periods. A history of produc-
tivities (θt) = {θs}s∈[0,t] is a sequence of realizations of the productivity process
that evolves according to the law of motion
dθt
θt
= µtdt+ σtdBt. (1)
The real constants µt−
1
2
σ2t and σt are, respectively, the drift and volatility of log-
productivity. When the drift and volatility are independent of time, productivity
is a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) and log-productivity is the continuous-
time limit of a random walk.
Agents have time-separable preferences over consumption {ct}0≤t≤T and labor
{lt}0≤t≤T processes that are progressively measurable with respect to the filtration
Ft.
4 When an agent is working, (lt > 0), he incurs a flow utility cost of staying in
the labor market φ(θt), and his current period utility is u(ct, lt)−φ(θt), where u is
increasing in consumption, decreasing in labor, twice continuously differentiable,
and concave. Utility along the intensive margin is separable in consumption and
labor and isoelastic in labor:
u(ct, lt) = u(ct)− h(lt) = u(ct)− κ
l
1+ 1
ε
t
1 + 1
ε
where ε > 0 is the intensive Frisch elasticity of labor supply. In Appendix A.15,
I extend the analysis to preferences that are non-separable in consumption and
4Consumption ct(θ
t) and labor lt(θ
t) depend on the whole history of productivities until time
t. In the text, I drop the realizations θt when referring to Ft-measurable processes {ct, yt} to
simplify the notation.
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labor.
The fixed utility cost of staying in the labor market can be thought of as
the utility cost of commuting time, work-related consumption costs, or taste for
leisure. I write it in units of utils for tractability. This fixed cost creates a non-
convexity in the disutility of work as agents prefer no work to a few hours of work.
As in French (2005) and Rogerson and Wallenius (2013), these non-convexities
trigger retirement at some point in the worker’s life.
Retirement, lt = 0, is an irreversible decision. Define a stopping time TR ∈ T ,
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the age after which a retired agent provides zero labor effort and does not incur
the fixed utility cost. After retirement, an agent’s utility in each period is u(ct, 0).
I define the retirement age as the age at which an individual chooses to exit the
labor force forever6—which the model allows to differ from the age at which an
individual chooses to start claiming Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) benefits.7
Planning Problem Preferences over consumption and labor {ct, lt} and retire-
ment decisions {TR} are summarized by an agent’s expected lifetime utility:
v0({ct, lt,TR}) ≡ E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt[u(ct, lt)− φ(θt)]dt+
∫ T
TR
e−ρtu(ct, 0)dt
}
(2)
in which ρ is the rate of time preference. A utilitarian planner chooses incentive-
compatible (IC) allocations to maximize social welfare:
max
{ct,lt,TR}
v0({ct, lt,TR}) (3)
subject to the law of motion of productivity (1), the definition of indirect utility
(2) and an intertemporal resource constraint. For simplicity, I work in partial
equilibrium, and the planner can save aggregate resources in a small open economy
and borrow at a net rate of return r. I study the planner’s problem for a single
5A random variable TR is a stopping time if {TR ≤ t} ∈ Ft, ∀t ≥ 0. Intuitively, this definition
means that at any time t, one must know whether retirement has occurred or not.
6The irreversible retirement assumption is motivated by empirical and theoretical reasons.
Rogerson and Wallenius (2013) find empirical evidence in the Current Population Survey data
that retirement occurs as abrupt transitions from full-time to little or no work in the U.S. By age
70, the age by which individuals should start claiming SS benefits, 75% of men report working
zero hours. In addition, this assumption is without loss of generality and can be relaxed. The
main predictions of the model remain unchanged if this paper allows for retirees to return to the
labor market at a lower wage.
7In a decentralized economy, workers can actually claim SS benefits whenever they want, and
their optimal retirement benefits system are computed according to the history of their earnings.
Because I work with allocations directly in this primal approach, the SS benefits are implicit in
the model.
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cohort in isolation and abstract from intergenerational redistribution issues.8 The
planner’s resource constraint is therefore:
E
{∫ T
0
e−rtctdt
}
+G ≤ E
{∫ TR
0
e−rtθtltdt
}
. (4)
The left-hand side includes exogenous government spending G9 and the cost of
providing lifetime consumption to agents. The right-hand side is the sum of the net
present value (NPV) of income yt generated by workers until they retire. Because
of the law of large numbers, the aggregate resource constraint is the expectation
over the histories of productivities (θt).
2.1 The Full Information Benchmark
This section solves the planning problem with full information. I highlight features
of the optimal retirement decision that are absent in existing models with no
endogenous retirement choice but have important implications for optimal policy.
Let the rate of time preference equal the rate of return of government savings,
ρ = r. From the intertemporal Euler equation, productivity shocks are fully
insured and consumption is the same across different histories: u′(ct(θ
t)) = λ,
where λ is the marginal social cost of public funds.10 When it is optimal to
work, the marginal rate of transformation of labor into consumption is the wage
rate, θt. Therefore, labor supply satisfies κl
1
ε
t = λθt. With full information, the
planner maximizes social welfare by maximizing total resources available in the
economy. Consumption is smoothed and more productive agents work more hours
and produce more output. It is only natural then that, as long as the fixed cost of
staying in the labor market for highly productive workers is not too high compared
to that of lowly productive workers (Technical Assumption 1), the planner makes
highly productive workers retire later than lowly productive workers.
Assumption 1. For some constant ψ, φ
′
(θ) ≤ ψθε, ∀θ.
Proposition 1. (First-best retirement decision) Suppose that Assumption 1 holds.
Then there exists a time-dependent productivity threshold θfbR (t) such that retire-
ment occurs if and only if productivity falls below it: T fbR = inf{t; θt ≤ θ
fb
R (t)}.
8Given that I study insurance and redistribution across one cohort, time is equivalent to age
for the cohort.
9G can capture many sources of exogenous government revenues and expenses as well as
intergenerational transfers to or from another cohort etc.
10λ the multiplier on the planner’s resource constraint (4)
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The proof is in Appendix A. This proposition means that the planner balances
the need to induce the highly productive (high wage) agents to continue working
with the need to avoid the fixed utility cost for less productive (low earning)
workers. In the first-best case, it is therefore, optimal to set productivity cut-offs
below which retirement occurs.
To understand the determinants and lifetime evolution of these retirement
cut-offs, I consider the case in which agents are risk neutral.
In this tractable case, I analytically show that there is an option value of
waiting for higher productivity shocks before retirement. In addition, this option
value decreases over time. Therefore, the implicit labor supply elasticity over the
retirement margin increases over time. The following corollary summarizes this
result in terms of the retirement thresholds θfbR (t).
Corollary 1. (Option value of continued work vs. retirement) Suppose that As-
sumption 1 holds and productivity is a GBM. Denote θS the static participation
threshold.
1. For all t < T , θfbR (t) ≤ θS and the marginal social value of continued work is
negative at retirement, i.e, θfbR (t)l
fb(θfbR (t))− h(l
fb(θfbR (t)))− φ(θ
fb
R (t)) ≤ 0 .
2. The retirement thresholds θfbR (t) are increasing in t. In addition, lim
t→T
θfbR (t) = θS.
Point 1 of the corollary states that retirement occurs below a productivity level
at which it would be efficient not to work in a static environment. This creates
an option value of waiting for higher productivity shocks and higher earnings be-
fore retirement that is not present in models with permanent productivity shocks
like Michau (2014) or Shourideh and Troshkin (2015). Working today instead of
retiring preserves the option of retiring later at a higher wage, hence the term "op-
tion value" of work. Indeed, when there is no uncertainty on future earnings, the
marginal value of labor is equal to the fixed utility cost of work at retirement, and
the option value is zero. In practice, this option value is negative at retirement.
Rust (1989), Lazear and Moore (1988) and Stock and Wise (1988) estimate struc-
tural models of retirement with uncertain earnings and find that people continue
to work at any age, as long as the expected present utility value of continuing
work is greater or equal to the expected present value of immediate retirement.
Point 2 of the corollary states that the option value of continued work decreases
over time as the horizon shortens. The option value of continued work vanishes at
the end of the horizon and only then is the irreversible retirement decision similar
to a static participation decision and the marginal value of labor equal to the fixed
utility cost of work.
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To develop some intuition, set11 φ(θ) = φ0 + φ1θ
1+ε, and consider the infinite
horizon limit T →∞. In this case, the retirement threshold is independent of time,
θfbR . The proof in Appendix A proceeds similarly to Leland (1994) by decomposing
the value of social welfare into two terms:
w(θ) = A(φ1)θ
1+ε −
φ0
ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
social value of working
forever (SVWF)
− (
θfbR
θ
)x︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounting at
retirement E[e−ρT
fb
R |θ]
[A(φ1)(θ
fb
R )
1+ε −
φ0
ρ
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
SVWF starting at
retirement threshold
(5)
where the positive constant x and non-increasing function A(φ1) are defined in
the Appendix A. The value of social welfare w(θ) is the value of lifetime utility
of output if the agent were to work forever, minus the value of lifetime utility of
output if he were to work forever at the optimal retirement threshold, discounted
by the expected value of the discount factor at retirement. This value is zero at
retirement. From a smooth pasting argument as in Dixit (1993), the value of its
marginal social welfare is also zero at retirement. This gives an explicit value of
the retirement threshold
θfbR =
(φ0
ρ
x
A(φ1)(1 + ε+ x)
) 1
ε
. (6)
and the static participation threshold is
θS = (
φ0
[κε(1 + ε)]−1 − φ1
)
1
ε
Note that both θfbR and θS are increasing in φ0 and in φ1,
12 meaning that workers
retire earlier when their fixed costs are large. In addition, the marginal social
value of continued work is negative at retirement θfbR < θS.
In summary, the solution of the first-best planning problem generates the
following insights about the implications of optimal retirement: First, lowly pro-
ductive agents retire earlier than highly productive agents. Second, there is an
option value of waiting for higher earnings before retiring. Therefore, the implicit
labor supply elasticity increases over time.
When the planner cannot observe productivity, first-best allocations with con-
stant consumption are not achievable as any agent would be better off retiring
immediately. Nevertheless, history-dependent versions of these intuitions carry
11With φ1 < 1/(κ
ε(1+ε)). The proof in Appendix A, considers in general any constant, power
function, or linear combination thereof φ(θ) = φ0 + φ1θ
1+εφ with εφ ≤ ε.
12For convergence of net present values, I assume that ρ > µ > σ2ε/2 in the proof in the
Appendix A.
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Figure 1: First-Best Retirement Decision
Note: Example of productivity history. Horizontal axis t, vertical axis θt. Retirement region
shaded. θs: static participation cut-off. The retirement region expands with age.
through in the second-best retirement policies.
3 The Social Insurance Problem
This section studies the second-best problem in which productivity and its evo-
lution is private information to the planner. I start by setting up the planning
problem with full IC constraints. Then, I relax the incentive problem using the
First Order Approach (FOA) procedure developed in Farhi and Werning (2013),
and I incorporate the retirement decision. Finally, through a redefinition of the
state space, I write a recursive formulation of the FOA.
3.1 Incentive Compatibility
In the second-best problem, both the agents and the planner observe consumption
{ct}, retirement status TR and income from work {yt}. However, the planner does
not observe {θt}, and therefore does not observe labor {lt = yt/θt} either. As a
result, the planner needs to incentivize the agents with dynamic contracts.
A contract is a both a consumption process {ct} and a stochastic retirement
time TR that are adapted to the filtration generated by {yt}.
13 By the revela-
tion principle, a contract is a mapping from any reported process of productivities
13The planner’s objective is concave and the optimal contract cannot be strictly improved by
randomization over allocations and stopping times.
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σ({θt}) = {θ˜t} to a triplet {c˜t, y˜t, T˜R} of processes adapted to the filtration gen-
erated by {θ˜t}. It specifies the consumption, output, and retirement status at any
time. An allocation is IC if it is the outcome of a contract in which it is optimal for
the agent to truthfully reveal his true productivity process {θt}. In other words,
for any reporting strategy σ, E{v0({ct, lt,TR})} ≥ E
σ{v({c˜t, y˜t, T˜R})}, where E
σ
is the expectation over the paths generated by reports. The planner commits to
a non-renegotiable contract at time zero.
In order to characterize allocations, I now relax the planner’s incentive con-
straints.
3.2 Recursive Formulation of the Planning Problem
The planner’s cost of providing an allocation {ct, lt = yt/θt,TR} is
K0(v) = min
{c,y,TR}
E
{∫ T
0
e−ρtctdt−
∫
TR
0
e−ρtytdt
}
(7)
By duality, the planner’s problem is equivalent to minimizing the cost of provid-
ing allocations (7), subject to a minimum promised utility v0 ≥ v, full incentive
compatibility and the law of motion of productivity (1).
The First Order Approach (FOA) relaxes the IC constraints by restricting
attention to local deviations. An IC mechanism must be immune to such devi-
ations. As a result, the sensitivity of promised utility with respect to reports,
denoted by ∆t ≡ ∂θvt, satisfies an envelope condition on the agent’s optimal re-
porting problem. I discuss the optimal reporting problem in detail in Appendix
A.
Kapička (2013), Farhi and Werning (2013), and Golosov et al. (2016) im-
plement the FOA in the context of optimal taxation, while Williams (2011) and
Sannikov (2014) do so in the context of optimal contracting in continuous-time.
It is a necessary, but not generally sufficient, condition for an allocation to be
IC.14 In the numerical analysis, I verify ex-post that the allocations obtained from
the FOA satisfy full incentive compatibility using a method developed by Farhi
and Werning (2013) that does not require solving for the full incentive-compatible
mechanism. I continue the recursive formulation of the problem and reparametrize
the state space in a simpler form. The lemma below derives the law of motion of
promised utility and its sensitivity and allows me to solve the problem recursively.
Lemma 1. (Law of motion of promised utility and sensitivity)
14Nevertheless, it gives a lower bound on the cost of providing a given promised utility to the
agents.
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1. The law of motion of promised utility is
dvt = (ρvt − u(ct,
yt
θt
) + φ(θt))dt+ θt∆tσtdBt (8)
with the boundary condition
vo = v.
2. (FOA) The law of motion of the sensitivity process ∆t ≡ ∂θvt is
d∆t =
[(
ρ− µt
)
∆t − uθ(ct,
yt
θt
) + φ′(θt)− σ∆,tσt
]
dt+ σ∆,tσtdBt (9)
with the boundary condition
∆0 = argmin
∆
K0(v,∆).
Point 1 of this lemma states that the drift of promised utility is the discounted
flow utility which features the fixed cost φ(θt). Importantly, it highlights that the
volatility of promised utility is controlled by the sensitivity process. The boundary
condition is the promise-keeping constraint. Point 2 of the lemma characterizes
how the sensitivity with respect to reports is linked to allocations in an incentive-
compatible mechanism, i.e., the evolution of informational rents.15 Technically, the
term uθ constitutes the rent in the static Mirrlees model, while the term σ∆,sσt is
a dynamic rent that summarizes an agent’s advance information about his future
productivity profile. The term µ∆s captures how a misreport today affects the
planner’s perceived distribution of productivities in the future. The term φ′(θt)
is the novel departure from the dynamic taxation literature and constitutes rents
due to the fact that fixed costs are unobserved by the planner. The boundary
condition ensures that the initial sensitivity is chosen to minimize the ex-ante cost
of providing promised utility, v. The proof is in Appendix A.
These recursive formulations allow me to analyze the relaxed planning prob-
lem. In a final step, I work for tractability with dual variables of (vt,∆t) that
are derivatives of the cost function with respect to these state variables: λt = Kv
and γt = K∆. The economic intuition behind these state variables is that they
represent the marginal change in the cost of providing allocations when promised
utility vt or, respectively, its sensitivity ∆t is marginally increased.
16 Then I solve
the planner’s problem recursively in the endogenous state space (λt, γt, θt, t), which
15Informational rents are rents the highly productive agents derive from having information
on their types that is not available to the planner.
16Because of the Pontryagin Maximum Principle, (see Bismut (1973)) this method of working
directly with the Lagrangians of the problem makes the problem tractable.
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is much smaller than the space of all histories of productivities.
4 Optimal Retirement Policies
For given allocations {c∗t , y
∗
t ,T
∗
R } that solve the relaxed planning problem, the
optimal distortion in the choices of individuals can be summarized by wedges.
Agents choose whether to work or retire, work hours conditional on working,
and savings. Below I define the corresponding retirement, labor, and savings
wedges which will be the main focus of this section. Section 6 proposes two
implementations of these allocations and corresponding wedges in a decentralized
economy.
4.1 Wedges: A Measure of Distortions
Definition 1. The labor wedge (or intratemporal wedge) τL conditional on work-
ing is the gap between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of
transformation between consumption and labor before retirement.
τLt ≡ 1 +
1
θt
ul(c
∗
t ,
y∗t
θt
)
uc(c∗t ,
y∗t
θt
)
(10)
The savings wedge (or intertemporal wedge) at time t and horizon s is the dif-
ference between the expected marginal rate of intertemporal substitution between
time t and time t+ s and the return on savings.
τKt,s ≡ 1− e
−(ρ−r)s
uc(c
∗
t ,
y∗t
θt
)
Et
{
uc(c∗t+s,
y∗
t+s
θt+s
)
∣∣∣Ft} (11)
The intertemporal wedge at time t is the marginal intertemporal wedge between
t and t+ dt, i.e., τKt =
dτKt,s
ds
∣∣∣
s=0
.
Let vlft (TR; {c
∗
t , y
∗
t , φ˜t}) be the expected utility under laisser-faire at time t
of an agent who privately chooses to retire at TR given second-best allocations
{c∗t , y
∗
t } and a virtual fixed cost φ˜t. I define the retirement wedge as the change in
fixed cost φ˜t = (1+τ
φ
t )φ(θt) that makes the agent privately choose the second-best
retirement decision T ∗R given {c
∗
t , y
∗
t , φ˜t}, ie:
T
∗
R = argmax
TR
vlft (TR; {c
∗
t , y
∗
t , (1 + τ
φ
t )φ(θt)}) (12)
A positive labor wedge implies that labor is distorted downwards. The savings
wedge represents the deviation from the Euler equation. These two wedges have
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been the main focus of the dynamic taxation literature.
A positive (resp. negative) retirement wedge means that participation is dis-
torted at time t towards early (resp. delayed) retirement. It is equal to the
increase (rep. reduction) in fixed utility cost that would make the agent privately
choose the second-best retirement decision given {c∗t , y
∗
t }. The marginal retire-
ment decision is forward-looking. At each age, the agent compares his expected
value of continued work against his expected value of retiring today. For exposi-
tory purposes, I define the retirement wedge implicitly and I provide its recursive
representation later in this section.
4.2 Optimal Labor and Savings Wedges
Before focusing on the retirement wedge, I characterize the standard labor and
savings wedges in the model with endogenous retirement. The proofs are presented
in Appendix A.
The labor wedge (Appendix A. Proposition 8) is shaped by similar forces as
in the standard model. In particular, when the cross-sectional variance of log-
productivity increases over time, the labor wedge increases over time due to the
insurance motive. But, the cost of insurance is decreased work incentives; the
more elastic the labor supply, the stronger the effect. As a result, the labor wedge
is related to the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Under separable utility, the standard Inverse Euler Equation (Rogerson (1985);
Golosov et al. (2003)) holds and leads to a positive savings wedge during work
years (Appendix A. Proposition 9). The main difference lies in the endogenous
retirement ages when savings are not distorted anymore.
4.3 The Net Retirement Wedge
The labor, savings and retirement wedges defined above, summarize the optimal
distortion in choices of the agents. With endogenous retirement, these distor-
tions interact in nontrivial ways. First, a positive labor wedge will distort both
hours and the retirement age downwards. Second, a positive savings wedge will
discourage retirement savings and delay retirement.
Hence, part of the retirement wedge is simply undoing the effects of labor and
savings distortions on retirement. Therefore, similar to Stantcheva (2017), I define
the net retirement wedge as the net distortion on retirement that filters out the
effects of labor and savings distortions on retirement.
To build intuition, suppose agents are risk neutral in consumption. Since
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agents are risk-neutral in consumption, the government does not need to distort
savings. Appendix A.10 shows that if the government has a redistributive motive
in the initial period,17 the persistence of the productivity process determines how
initial heterogeneity affects the labor wedge at time t,
τLt
1−τLt
= 1t
τL0
1−τL0
.The change
in fixed utility cost that would make the agent privately choose the second-best
retirement decision given {y∗t }
18 is:
τφt φ(θt) = τ
L
0
ε
1 + ε
y∗t︸ ︷︷ ︸
downward retirement distortion
from labor wedge
−
τL0
1− τL0
ε
1 + ε
εφ,θ(θt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net wedge
φ(θt) (13)
Where εφ,θ(θt) is the elasticity of the fixed utility cost with respect to productivity.
The first term is a positive fixed cost and comes from the fact that the of labor
wedge distorts retirement downward. The net retirement wedge τRt corrects for
this effect (τRt − τ
φ
t )φ(θt) = −τ
L
0
ε
1+ε
y∗t and is equal to the second term of (13) in
equilibrium.
In the more complex case with agents who are risk averse in consumption, the
definition of the net retirement wedge is presented in Appendix A. 8.
4.4 The Optimal Retirement Wedge
Proposition 2. The optimal retirement and labor wedges satisfy the following
relation:
τRt = −
τLt
1− τLt
ε
1 + ε
εφ,θ(θt) (14)
In particular τRt (θ
t) ≥ 0 iff φ′(θt) ≥ 0.
The proof is in Appendix A.8. Despite the complexity of the model, this
proposition leads to a simple equilibrium relation between the labor wedge and
the net retirement wedge. The final point of the proposition states that if the fixed
utility cost is increasing (resp. decreasing) in productivity, the social insurance
system incentivizes delayed (resp. early) retirement. Therefore, the relative differ-
17The government evaluates welfare using non-increasing Pareto weights α(θ0). Then
τLt
1−τLt
=
τ(θ0)
1−τ(θ0)
= (1 + 1ε )
1
θ0
Λ(θ0)−F (θ0)
f(θ0)
where Λ(θ0) =
∫
∞
0
α(θ0)dF (θ0)
18With quasilinear utility in consumption, the government minimizes the efficiency losses of
output. Aggregate consumption is pinned down by output through the intertemporal budget
constraint.
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ence of fixed utility cost between highly productive and lowly productive agents
plays a key role in signing the net labor wedge. I discuss empirical estimates and
calibration of this fixed cost in 5.2.
4.5 The Insurance Value of Endogenous Retirement
4.5.1 The Redistributive and Insurance Role of the Retirement Wedge
The fixed utility cost has two compounding effects on social welfare that deter-
mine the optimal net wedge. First, if the fixed cost is larger for highly productive
workers relative to lowly productive workers, continued work mostly benefits lowly
productive workers and therefore reduces inequality. This results in a positive ef-
fect on social welfare. The opposite would hold if the fixed cost was decreasing
in productivity. Second, if the fixed cost is increasing in productivity, the wel-
fare gains from delayed retirement are modulated by the size of labor distortions
because of their negative effect on labor force participation (on top of hours).
The larger the labor distortions, the harder it is for the government to incentivize
delayed retirement and therefore the larger is the optimal net retirement wedge.
Set φ(θ) = θ
1+1/εφ
1+1/εφ
, then εφ,θ(θt) = 1+1/εφ and the ratio of the net retirement
wedge and labor wedge is
τφt /(
τLt
1− τLt
) = −
1 + 1/εφ
1 + 1/ε
(15)
The net retirement wedge relative to the labor wedge is larger when ε is larger,
or when εφ is lower. Given labor distortions, the larger is the Frisch elasticity ε,
the harder it is for the government to incentivize delayed retirement and therefore
the larger is the optimal net retirement wedge. The lower is εφ, the larger are the
welfare gains from reducing inequality by incentivizing delayed retirement. and
the larger is the net wedge.
Technically, the insurance value of the net retirement wedge is related to the
fact that individuals possess private information about their types and fixed cost,
hence an efficient allocation must allow them to collect rents on that informa-
tion. If highly productive workers benefit less from delayed retirement than lower-
productivity workers (φ′ ≥ 0), then incentivizing for delaying retirement loosens
their incentive constraints. If workers benefit equally from delayed retirement
(φ′ = 0), it is optimal not to distort retirement decisions beyond the downward
retirement distortions due to the labor wedge. These downward retirement dis-
tortions are captured by the gross retirement wedge.
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4.5.2 Consumption Smoothing and Optimal Retirement
In addition to the wedges, the insurance value of endogenous retirement is present
in consumption after the endogenous retirement age, its net present value, and
the percentage change, if any, in consumption before and after retirement, which I
denote as
∆c
T
+
R
c
T
−
R
with an abuse of notation. After retirement, the incentive problem
stops since the agent does not need to be incentivized to work. Therefore, the
planner does not need to distort consumption decisions after retirement.
Lemma 2. Suppose r = ρ and u is strictly concave in consumption. Then, post-
retirement consumption is constant.
The result is intuitive: Since output is zero after retirement, there is no infor-
mation for the planner to learn about the agent’s real productivity after retirement.
Since there is no incentive constraint after retirement, the problem is one of full
insurance. The Euler equation holds intertemporally, and the marginal utility of
consumption at l = 0 is equalized cross-sectionally. Since uc is strictly decreasing,
it follows that consumption is constant after retirement.
This lemma implies that the retirement age is an endogenous age after which
there is perfect consumption smoothing. In addition, the level of consumption after
retirement and its net present value only depend on the history of productivities
up until retirement. However, this lemma allows for a distortion in consumption
“at” retirement between the last working period and the first period in retirement.
The following proposition shows that such a distortion is not optimal.
Proposition 3. Suppose r = ρ and u is strictly concave in consumption then post-
retirement consumption is equal to the final working period consumption: c
T
+
R
=
c
T
−
R
.
To minimize distortions, agents are given their last period consumption at
retirement in the separable utility case. Highly productive agents are offered cor-
respondingly higher retirement consumption than lowly productive agents. Tech-
nically, this lemma is a consequence of the smooth pasting condition (Dixit (1993)).
It implies that the marginal change in the cost of providing an infinitesimal
promised utility before and after retirement are equal. In the separable utility
case, it implies that there is no distortion in consumption at retirement.
Since consumption is smoothed after retirement and there is no labor effort,
the agent’s utility is not sensitive to the reports after retirement. The endogenous
retirement age is therefore the age at which the sensitivity is zero.19 It is more
19For incentive compatibility, given the same past history of productivity, promised utility is
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complex than the first-best retirement age since it depends on the whole history
of productivities through the endogenous sensitivity. In Appendix A.15, I show
that under Assumption 1 and risk neutral consumption, the optimal retirement
decision is such that highly productive agents retire later than lower-productivity
agents.
4.6 Age-Dependency of The Retirement Wedge
The analysis above links the retirement and labor wedges. It is also useful to pro-
vide a recursive representation of the optimal net wedge and highlight its evolution
over time.
Proposition 4. (Recursive Representation of the Net Wedge)
The optimal net wedge evolves according to
dτRt = −σc,tσ
2
t
(
εφ,θ(θt) + τ
R
t
θtε
′
φ,θ(θt)
εφ,θ(θt)
)
dt+ τRt
(du′(ct)
u′(ct)
+
dεφ,θ(θt)
εφ,θ(θt)
)
(16)
The proof is in Appendix A.9. To understand this evolution suppose that the
elasticity of the fixed cost with respect to productivity is a constant parameter
εφ,θ. Then equation (16) becomes
dτRt = −σc,tσ
2
t εφ,θdt+ τ
R
t
du′(ct)
u′(ct)
(17)
As for the labor wedge in Farhi and Werning (2013), equation (17) has a drift
term and an autoregressive term. The first term of is the instantaneous covari-
ance between log-productivity and the inverse of marginal utility of consumption
scaled by the elasticity of the fixed cost with respect to productivity. When the
instantaneous variance of log-productivity is non-zero, this drift is of the same
sign as εφ,θ. If εφ,θ > 0 i.e φ
′ > 0, then the net wedge becomes more negative
over time i.e the incentives for delayed retirement increase over time. The co-
variance of consumption growth and log-productivity represents the benefits of
increased insurance since it depends on fluctuations in consumption and the level
of risk aversion. In addition, the larger is the benefit of delayed retirement for
lower-productivity agents relative to highly productive, the larger are the insur-
ance gains from incentivizing delayed retirement, explaining the role of elasticity
εφ,θ. The second term is autoregressive and is scaled by the change in the marginal
utility of consumption. Since there is a positive savings wedge that vanishes at
higher for higher reports, so ∂θv = ∆ ≥ 0. The sensitivity process starts at a positive value
defined by ∆0 = argmin∆K0(v,∆), and follows the law of motion (9) until it hits zero, at which
point retirement is triggered, T ∗R = inf{t; ∆(θ
t) = 0}.
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retirement, consumption trends downwards and marginal utility of consumption
trends upwards over time.20 Thus, this term is of the same sign as the net wedge.
As a result, if εφ,θ > 0, the incentives for delayed retirement increase over time.
In addition, since the variance of consumption growth vanishes at retirement, the
net wedge becomes more strongly correlated over time. The general formula (16)
captures these effects, while accounting for the fact that a pathwise increase in
the benefit of delayed work for lower-productivity workers relative to highly pro-
ductive workers, dεφ,θ(θt) > 0, leads to an increase in the insurance gains from
delayed retirement.
5 Numerical Analysis
The roadmap of the numerical analysis presented below is the following: First,
I discuss the quantitative importance of extensive margin of labor supply in old
age through the fixed cost of staying in the labor market; second, I contrast the
labor, savings, and retirement wedges to those resulting from a standard model
with fixed or exogenous retirement; third, I explain the phenomenon of wedge
smoothing effect over the life cycle; and fourth, I examine the progressivity of the
retirement and labor wedges. The numerical algorithm, calibration details, and
additional results are presented in Computational Appendix B.
Before showing simulation results, I discuss the empirical evidence on the
extensive margin of labor supply in old age and the model’s crucial parameter, i.e.
the fixed cost of staying on the labor market and its evolution.
5.1 Empirical Evidence on the Extensive Margin of Labor
Supply in Old Age
There are various estimates of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply both on the
intensive and extensive margin. These estimates range from the small 0-0.5 in the
micro literature to the large 2-4 in the macro literature. Reichling and Whalen
(2012) and Peterman (2016) provide a survey of the estimates of the Frisch elas-
ticity of labor supply in the micro literature and in the macro literature.
To reconcile these differences, French (2005), Rogerson and Wallenius (2013),
Prescott et al. (2009), and Chang et al. (2014) estimate life cycle models with
endogenous retirement. They consider non-convexities in the labor supply decision
20Since from the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption is a martingale, the marginal
utility of consumption is a submartingale and its paths trend upwards.
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due to fixed time costs that match the hours worked and labor force participation
of old workers. They find that one needs large fixed time costs, around 5 to 6
hours a day, to match the work hours and the retirement data. In their estima-
tions of extensive margin elasticities, Chetty et al. (2012) find, in a model similar
to Rogerson and Wallenius (2013), that extensive margin labor supply responses
ought to be large to explain the gap between the micro and macro Frisch elastici-
ties. In addition, Banks et al. (1998) and Aguila et al. (2011) posit that there are
sizable fixed consumption costs related to work. In light of this, I set an intensive
Frisch elasticity of 0.5 (cf. Chetty (2012)), and I endogenously calibrate a fixed
utility cost of staying in the labor market that depends on age and productivity.
After the calibrations, I compare the time value and consumption value of the
resulting estimates with the time costs and consumption costs estimated in the
literature.
There is empirical evidence of variation in the extensive margin elasticities of
labor supply by age. Alpert and Powell (2013) find that participation elasticities
on the extensive margin with respect to after-tax labor income rise from close
to zero in young age to 0.76 for women and 0.55 for men at age 65 in the US.
Using French administrative data, Sicsic et al. (2020) find that french workers
have substantially larger labor supply elasticities after age 50. This is consistent
with the behavioral responses around retirement documented around the world
by Gruber and Wise (2002). Indeed, in the US, 55 is the first legal point of entry
into retirement through disability in the OASDI program. As a result, I let the
fixed cost increase with age.
Finally, the evidence on the relative magnitude of extensive margin elasticities
of labor supply between high and low earners is not conclusive. On the one hand,
Gruber and Saez (2002) and Kleven and Schultz (2014) find that the elasticity of
taxable income (ETI) is larger for high earners. Nonetheless, it is hard to disen-
tangle whether this difference comes from hours worked, participation, unobserved
effort, career choices, tax avoidance, and/or evasion. On the other hand, Sicsic
et al. (2020) find that in France, where there are large transfers to low wage work-
ers, the bottom half percentile has a larger ETI than the middle 40%-percentile,
but a lower ETI than the top 10% of wage earners. Since the relative magnitude
of the fixed cost of work between high wage and low wage workers matters for the
evolution of the net retirement wedge, I allow for two simulations. Simulation A
restricts the fixed cost to increase in wages. In contrast, Simulation B restricts
the fixed cost to decrease in wages.
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5.2 Calibration
Exogenously calibrated parameters In the simulated economies, agents live
for T = 55 periods, each period corresponding to 1 year from age 25 to 79. I set
the discount factor and the interest rate equal to ρ = r = 0.05. Since Deaton
and Paxson (1994), there is evidence that inequality in consumption and income
increases with age within a cohort. Consistent with these findings, I assume that
productivity is a geometric random walk with an age-dependent drift that captures
a hump-shaped productivity profile:21
log(θt) = µ(t) + log(θt−1) + ǫt
where ǫt ∼ N (−
σ2
2
, σ2).
Storesletten et al. (2004) have found a high estimate of the volatility σ2H =
0.0161 and Heathcote et al. (2010) found a low estimate of σ2L = 0.00625. In the
benchmark simulations, I choose an intermediate value of σ2M = 0.0095, in line
with Heathcote et al. (2005)’s estimate of a medium volatility. I calibrate µ(t)
using empirical analogs from wage data from the American Community Survey
(ACS), provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, controlling for possible selection in
the data. The method and calibrated values, presented in Appendix B, give an
average per-period productivity growth of +7% per year at age 25 and an average
productivity decline of −4% per year at age 79.
Preferences during working years are:
log(ct)−
κ
1 + 1
ε
(yt
θt
)1+ 1
ε
− φ(t)
with ε = 0.5 and κ = 1, consistent with the estimate of Chetty (2012). During
retirement, per period utility is simply log(ct). While many parameters are read-
ily estimated from the literature, the fixed cost function φ(θ, t) is an important
parameter to calibrate in the model. I endogenously calibrate the fixed costs in a
baseline U.S. economy.
Endogenously matched parameters in the baseline US economy The
baseline economy is the income fluctuation model in which agents who start with
zero asset holdings, experience idiosyncratic productivity shocks, freely save and
borrow in a risk-free asset subject to the natural borrowing limit, choose their
consumption, work hours, and their retirement age. For simplicity, I assume that
21Farhi and Werning (2013) and Stantcheva (2017) consider productivity that is a geometric
random walk without drift.
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agents start claiming retirement benefits whenever they exit the labor force with-
out loss of generality.22 The tax system is set to mimic the U.S. tax system. I
follow Heathcote et al. (2014) and set the labor income tax equal to the approx-
imation function:
T (yt) = yt − λtaxy
1−τtax
t
where their value of the progressivity parameter τtax is 0.181. The tax on savings
is set to a flat tax rate equal to 20% of capital gains.
The SS benefits system in the baseline features three specific ages that are
important for the availability and value of retirement benefits in the US. First,
the Full Benefits Age (FBA), which I set at 66 for the present cohort, is the age
at which a worker can claim the full amount of retirement benefits, the Primary
Insurance Amount (PIA). The PIA is a function of the Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME), the average monthly earnings of the 35 highest earning years.
The PIA follows a progressive benefit schedule.23 Thus, I use the same method
used for tax functions and approximate SS benefits using
PIA(AIME) = λssAIME
1−τss .
I follow Heathcote et al. (2014) and estimate that τss = 0.37 by running a re-
gression on the log version of this equation, the details of which are in Appendix
B.
Second, the Early Eligibility Age (EEA=62) is the age at which an agent can
start claiming retirement benefits. For each year between the EEA and the FBA,
an individual who starts claiming benefits at that age loses 6.67% points of the PIA
per early year (the Actuarial Reduction Factor, ARF). For instance, someone who
retires at age 63 gets 80% of his PIA. Third, benefits are automatically distributed
after age 70. For each year between the FBA and 70, an individual who starts
claiming benefits at that age gains 8% points of the PIA per year delayed (the
22Making the retirement age and claiming age different turns out not to matter quantitatively
for the results in numerical tests. First, because the SS adjustment rate is higher than the
real interest rate, workers would only want to start claiming benefits while working if they
were tightly borrowing constrained. Because of log utility in consumption, workers never hit
the natural borrowing limit. Therefore, the only case in which a worker would want to start
claiming benefits while continuing to work is when a previously highly productive worker, with
large expected SS benefits, becomes so unproductive that his current income and accumulated
assets are not enough for him to sustain his high level of consumption. Because of the high
persistence in the productivity process, the fraction of such workers is small.
23In the U.S. SS system, the PIA is a step function of the AIME. The first bracket gives a PIA
with a replacement rate of 90% of the AIME until the AIME reaches $895. The second bracket
gives a replacement rate of 32% until it reaches $5,397. Finally, the third bracket replaces 15%
of the AIMEs over $5,397 and below an earnings cap of $127,200.
24
Delayed Retirement Credit, DRC). For instance, someone who retires at age 70,
gets 132% of his PIA, the maximum actuarial24 adjustment.
In this baseline economy, I calibrate the fixed costs and the parameters of the
tax function λtax and the SS function λSS. To discipline the level of taxes λtax,
I endogenously match the income-weighted average marginal tax that Barro and
Redlick (2011) finds to be around 37%. Another target for λSS is to generate
the average replacement rate of SS benefits at the FBA. Munnell and Soto (2005)
report this value at 42%.
Following the discussion on the empirical evidence on the Subsection 5.1, I
calibrate specifications of fixed costs φ(θ, t) that have one component that increases
in age φ1(t) and one component φ0(θ) that increases in productivity in Simulation
A, and decreases in productivity in Simulation B: φ(θ, t) = φ0(θ) + φ1(t). The
time-dependent component of the fixed costs is constant until age 55 - when the
first point of entry into retirement through the OASDI’s disability program occurs
in the U.S. - then increases linearly until age 79 as φ1(t) = a + b(t − 55)
+. The
productivity-dependent component of the fixed cost is logarithmic, φ0(θ) = φ ln(θ)
where φ > 0 in Simulation A and φ < 0 in Simulation B. I calibrate the levels φ
and a, in order to generate moments of labor force participation rate in old age
such as the labor force participation rates for ages 62-64 (50.4% in 2016 in the
U.S. population from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics report Toossi (2015)),
ages 65-69 (32.2%), and I normalize their relative ratio to match the labor force
participation rate of the young for ages 25-54 (81.3%). I calibrate the time slope
b, in order to generate a measure of age change in extensive margin elasticity of
labor supply in old age, as in French (2005). 25
Table 1 summarizes the calibrated values. Simulations A and B yield a value
of φ = 0.4 and φ = −0.7 respectively. In particular, in Simulation A (resp B) the
fixed cost of the mean wage agent is equivalent to 4.26 hours (resp 6.88 hours) per
day in terms of time cost at age 55 that increases by 10 minutes (resp 2.6 minutes)
each year until attaining 8.67 hours (resp 7.75 hours) per day at age 79.26 These
estimates are within the range of estimates in Chang et al. (2014).
24The standard term used for these adjustments does not necessarily imply that they are
actuarially fair.
25I match the percentage change in the average retirement age after a 1% unexpected increase
in income at age 65.
26To compute the time value of fixed utility costs, I follow Shourideh and Troshkin (2015) and
use parameters from Chang et al. (2014) who estimates a model similar to this paper’s baseline
economy. I take the estimates of κˆ = 82.70 from Table 1 of Chang et al. (2014) for ε = 0.5
and the lowest variance σx, which (annualized) is closest to the median variance σM . I link the
estimate of the fixed utility cost φˆ to its time cost lˆ by solving κˆ
lˆ1+1/ε
1 + 1/ε
= φˆ.
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Table 1: Calibration
concept functional form Sim A Sim B source/target
Exogenously parametrized
log θt = µ(t) + ρ log θt−1 + εt ρ = 1 Storesletten et al. (2004)
productivity
ε ∼ N(−σ
2
2 , σ
2)
σ2M = 0.0095 Heathcote et al. (2005)
µˆ : 7%ց −4% Ruggles et al. (2018)
utility log c− κ
1+ 1
ε
(yθ )
1+ 1
ε κ = 1, ε = 0.5 Chetty (2012)
Endogenously calibrated in baseline U.S. economy
fixed cost
φ0(θ) = φ ln(θ) φˆ = 0.4 φˆ = −0.7 E25−54, E62−64, E65−69
φ1(t) = a+ b(t− 55)
+
aˆ = 4.26h/d aˆ = 6.88h/d 81.3%, 50.4%, 32.3%
bˆ = 10mn/d bˆ = 2.6mn/d ε65 = 1.05
tax function T (y) = y − λtaxy
1−0.181HSVtax λˆtax = 0.83 λˆtax = 0.83 T ′(y) = 37%
SS function PIA(AIME) = λSSAIME
0.67ACSSS λˆss = 0.62 λˆss = 0.64 PIA = 42%
For each simulation, I compute the policy functions for the calibrated values
above. From these policy functions, I perform a Monte Carlo simulation with
N=100,000 draws. Ex-ante welfare is set to result in an aggregate cost of alloca-
tions equal to that in the baseline economy, which provides the value of G for each
simulation. To compare allocations from different simulations, I fix the seed across
Monte Carlo simulations, and I convert G into the US national debt-per-capita
in dollar terms when needed. This gives a sense of outcomes achievable without
additional government debt and ensures consistency across simulations.
To have a sense of the fit of this calibration to the data, Appendix B contains
graphs of the implied labor force participation rate and hazard ratio at each age,
the implied mean consumption, income, total assets, and assets of retirees, as
well as the variances of wages, income, and consumption over the life cycle in
the baseline economy. The labor force participation rates that result from the
fixed costs match the BLS data in Toossi (2015) to a first order, with spikes in
retirement at 62 and 66. In particular, the variances of log wages and earnings
match the estimates in Heathcote et al. (2010).
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5.3 Results
The labor and savings wedges with and without endogenous retirement
Figure 2 contrasts the labor and savings wedges that result from the optimum for
each value of φ to those of a model with exogenous retirement where the retire-
ment age T exoR is independent of the history of income realizations. The process
for T exoR is exogenously chosen so that both models generate the same labor force
participation rate over the life cycle in the baseline economy. Hence, the exper-
iment holds observed retirement behavior fixed and determines the difference in
optimal policies if those retirement ages were the result of an endogenous decision
or were generated by an exogenous process.
In Panel A, the labor wedge is smaller when φ > 0. The reason is that some of
the burden of the labor wedge is achieved by the redistribution and insurance value
of endogenous retirement. On the other hand, when φ < 0, continued work has a
negative insurance or redistributive role , and the role is on the labor wedge, which
becomes larger. The labor wedge grows until old age when agents start retiring.
Then, the reduction in inequality among remaining workers, when retirement is
endogenous, leads to the a drop in the labor wedge. Thus, the labor wedge is
slightly hump-shaped.
Panel B plots the savings wedge in percentages of net interest as a function of
age. The savings wedge is small in units of gross interest on savings but can be as
high as 30% of net interest. It is larger when φ < 0. Compared to the exogenous
retirement case, savings are less distorted when continued work has a positive re-
distributive and insurance role (φ > 0) since endogenous retirement helps in the
government’s screening problem. On the other hand, savings become more dis-
torted when endogenous retirement increases the rents of highly productive agents,
(φ < 0). In addition, as shown in Appendix A. Proposition 9, the savings wedge is
proportional to the variance of consumption growth. At retirement, consumption
is constant and the savings wedge is zero. This force pushes for decreasing the
savings wedge over time. In particular, the predictable component of the inno-
vations to productivity, captured by µ(t), is insured through the intertemporal
(savings) wedge. The calibrated values µˆ(t) generate productivity profiles that
are hump-shaped in age. Therefore, the savings wedge is hump-shaped in age
as a combination of its convergence to zero at retirement and the intertemporal
insurance of µ(t).
27
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Age
L
ab
or
w
ed
ge
τ
L
A
φ = 0.4
φ = -0.7
exogenous retirement
20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
5 · 10−2
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Age
S
av
in
gs
w
ed
ge
τ
S
,
in
%
of
r
B
φ = 0.4
φ = -0.7
exogenous retirement
Figure 2: Average labor and savings wedges over time. The labor and savings
wedges are smaller when continued work has a positive insurance value (φ > 0).
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The retirement wedge Figure 3 presents the net retirement wedge scaled by
the fixed cost τRt φt for the ease of comparison with a fixed utility cost of work.
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The net retirement wedge captures the true incentive effect of the social insurance
system on retirement. A positive (negative) net retirement wedge means that
participation is distorted towards early (delayed) retirement after filtering out the
effects of labor and savings distortions on retirement. With φ = 0.4, delayed
retirement has a positive insurance value and the wedge is negative, i.e. it is
optimal to distort retirement decisions upwards, against downward retirement
distortions due to the labor wedge. The opposite is true when φ = −0.7. Finally,
the net wedge is declining when φ = 0.4, and growing otherwise, as inferred in the
drift of formula (16).
The sign of φ′t(θ) clearly matters for the direction of the net wedge. Shourideh
and Troshkin (2015) calibrate this fixed cost of work using the HRS and PSID
and find that it increases with lifetime earnings. As discussed above, one possible
interpretation of the fixed cost is work-related expenses. Banks et al. (1998)
(Figure 7.) and Aguiar and Hurst (2013) (Figure 2.A) empirically estimate that
work-related expenses are hump-shaped in age just as our estimate of the drift of
log-productivity µˆ(t). These suggest that taking the fixed cost to increase with
productivity, i.e. φ > 0, is a reasonable assumption. I do not, however, take
a stand on the sign of φ, whose empirical estimate is an important question of
study. Instead, in the rest of the paper, I will consider the implications of both
possibilities and discuss policy implications for retirement benefits systems around
the world and the US SS system in particular.
Retirement wedge smoothing over the life cycle Figure 4 plots the rela-
tionship between the net retirement wedge at age t and the net retirement wedge
at age t− 1 for middle-aged adults (age 35 in Panel A) and old-aged workers (age
55 in Panel B).28 At a young age, the net wedge is more volatile from one period
to the next. However, it becomes more deterministic over time, leading to a retire-
ment wedge smoothing result. The previous dynamic taxation literature has found
a similar “tax smoothing” result for the labor wedge (which continues to hold in
the presence of endogenous retirement.) Similar intuitions for these results carry
through. A wage shock early in life is persistent. It has consequences over many
years, leading to a larger present value change in the income flow than a shock
27In utility terms, the fixed cost of work at age 55 of the mean wage agent is 0.154 for φ = 0.4
and 0.65 for φ = −0.7. An alternative (and equivalent) definition of the net retirement would
be directly in levels of the fixed utility cost.
28Arbitrary cut-offs for these age categories yield similar results.
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Figure 3: Average net retirement wedge over time.
later in life. As the agent smoothes out the shock, consumption at a young age
will react strongly to unexpected changes in wages. The variance of consumption
growth and the savings wedge vanish at retirement. Therefore, from the evolution
of the net retirement wedge in Proposition 4, the net retirement wedge becomes
more strongly correlated with age.
Progressivity or regressivity of the net retirement and labor wedges.
Figure 5 plots the labor wedge τLt , against the contemporaneous productivity
shock, θt, at the arbitrarily chosen prime age of 44 and Figure 6 does a similar
exercise for the net retirement wedge. Panels A (resp. B) are for simulations with
a positive (resp. negative) insurance value of delayed retirement φ = 0.4 (resp.
φ = −0.7).
The labor wedge is always regressive in the short-run, whether delayed retire-
ment has a positive insurance value (Panel A) or the opposite (Panel B). This
short-run regressivity of the labor wedge also holds in the model with exogenous
retirement. However, with endogenous retirement, the labor wedge is less regres-
sive in the short-run when continued work has a positive insurance value (Panel
A relative to Panel B). The reason is that short-run regressivity captures the fact
that good productivity shocks raise consumption and lower labor distortions, at
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Figure 4: Retirement wedge smoothing with age. The net retirement wedge be-
comes more correlated from one period to the next as age increases because the
variance of consumption growth, which drives changes in the wedge over time,
vanishes at retirement. Figures are for φ = 0.4.
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least in the short-run. When delayed retirement has a positive insurance value,
subsidizing delayed retirement with a negative net retirement wedge decreases the
need to reduce the labor wedge.
When φ > 0, the net retirement wedge is progressive in the short run. On the
other hand, when φ < 0, the net retirement wedge exhibits short-run regressivity.
The reason for this inverse pattern is that both the labor wedge and the net
retirement wedge are tools to insure against earnings risk. At the optimum, they
evolve according to the key relation (14). The labor wedge always has positive
insurance and redistributive effects. The same is true for incentivizing delayed
retirement (negative net retirement wedge), only if φ > 0. Accordingly, the two
instruments comove negatively when φ > 0 and positively when φ < 0.
6 Implementation and Policy Implications
The previous sections determine the wedges that summarize distortions from opti-
mal allocations in a direct revelation mechanism. In this section, I instead consider
what policy instruments can implement those allocations. There are many possi-
ble implementations. Theory alone does not guide as to which one to choose since
political or administrative constraints are important for tax and pension systems
in practice. I present two implementations that are particularly useful because
they are variations in existing policies around the world and the US.
6.1 Retirement Benefits
First, I describe the decentralized economy and introduce some notation. In the
decentralized economy, agents choose whether to work or retire wt ∈ {0, 1}, hours
conditional on work and therefore income yt, consumption ct, and savings at in a
risk-free asset at a gross interest rate r. We keep the restriction that retirement
is irreversible (If wt = 0 then ys = ws = 0 ∀ s ≥ t) as the imposed constraint
on the optimal mechanism. Agents are endowed with zero initial assets.29 This
implementation follows similar steps as Werning (2011) and Stantcheva (2017) and
adds retirement benefits.
Denote by m∗({θt}) the optimal allocation of the social planner’s problem af-
ter history {θt} for any choice variable m ∈ {w, y, c, a}. For any history {θt} and
subset of variables m ⊂ {r, y, c, a}, let Qtm({θ
t−}) be the set of values for these
29Agents can differ in initial asset holding as long as it is observable. The proposed retirement
benefits would then depend on initial assets as well.
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Figure 5: Regressivity of the labor wedge. The labor wedge is regressive in the
short-run but less so when continued work has a positive redistributive value
φ = 0.4 (Panel A).
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Figure 6: Progressivity and regressivity of the net retirement wedge. The net
retirement wedge exhibits short-run progressivity when φ = 0.4 (Panel A) but
short-run regressivity when φ = −0.7 (Panel B).
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variables at time t, which could arise in the planner’s problem after history {θt−},
that is, such that for some θt ∈ (0,+∞), mt = m
∗
t ({θ
t−, θ}). For a history of ob-
served choices {mt}, denote by Θt(mt) the set of all histories consistent with these
choices, that is, all {θt} such that {mt} = {m
∗
t ({θ
t})}. Assumption 2 guarantees
that in the planner’s problem, the income histories can be uniquely inverted to
identify the history of productivities until retirement.
Assumption 2. Θt({wt, yt}) is either the empty set or a singleton for all histories
{wt, yt} such that {wt} = {1}s≤t.
In the proposed implementation in Proposition 5, retirement benefits, b, are
combined with a history-dependent tax on labor income, Ty(wt, {y
t}), and a his-
tory independent savings tax, Ts(at). The agent’s problem is
v(a0, θ0) = max
wt,yt,ct,at
E
{∫ T
0
e−ρt[u(ct)− (h(
yt
θt
) + φ(θt))wt]dt
}
(18)
such that
dat = [yt − T (wt, {y
t}) + b(wt, {y
t}) + rat − Ts(at)− ct]dt,
a0 = 0, aT ≥ 0. If wt = 0, then ys = ws = 0 ∀s ≥ t.
Proposition 5. The optimum can be implemented through retirement benefits
b(wt, {y
t}) contingent on the history of income until retirement together with a
history independent savings tax Ts(at) and a history-dependent tax on labor income
Ty(wt, {y
t}).
6.1.1 Features of the Retirement Benefits System
Figure 7 illustrates the implementation through retirement benefits, by plotting
in Panel A the income tax rate paid out of earned income (which include the labor
income tax and the retirement contributions in the payroll tax) and in Panel B,
the average pension annuities in USD as a function of retirement age.30
In Panel A, the average earned income tax subsidizes labor supply at a young
age because labor distortions increase over the majority of the lifetime. Then it
is hump-shaped as a result of the hump-shaped profile of labor earnings. In par-
ticular, the average tax on earned income is smaller when incentivizing delayed
retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role (φ = 0.4), reflecting
30To convert the NPV of lifetime income is USD, I normalize the different simulations by
imposing exogenous government spending at the baseline economy equal to the gross federal
debt of 69,060 USD per-capita in 2019.
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that endogenous retirement incentives fulfill part of the redistribution and insur-
ance and takes some of the burden away from the earned income tax. As workers
retire in old-age, the remaining workforce gets mostly selected into highly pro-
ductive workers who pay higher average earned income taxes. This effect is more
prevalent when incentivizing the delayed retirement of highly productive workers
has a positive redistributive and insurance role (φ = 0.4).
In Panel B, the yearly retirement benefits (pension annuities) increase as a
function of each retirement age group, reflecting the need to complement the
tax system with retirement benefits that are increase in claiming-age. Recall
that both the earned income tax and the tax on savings create distortions in
the retirement decision. Labor-led distortions push retirements downwards, and
savings-led distortions push retirement upwards. Since the tax on savings is small
relative to the earned income tax, labor-led distortions dominate, and on net,
these taxes lead to a push towards early retirement. The retirement benefits must
counterbalance this effect first. This explains why retirement benefits increase with
retirement age for both simulations with φ = 0.4 and φ = −0.7. Comparatively,
the slope of the retirement benefits is steeper in retirement age when incentivizing
delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role, (φ = 0.4).
Before highlighting the insurance role of the retirement benefits system, it is
worthwhile discussing the insurance role of the social insurance system as a whole
and the tax and retirement contribution system in isolation.31 In summary, the
social insurance system provides a significant degree of insurance relative to au-
tarky. This result is also true in a model with exogenous retirement. A novel point
of my analysis is that this overall degree of insurance is larger when incentivizing
for delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role (φ = 0.4).
In addition, both the social insurance system overall and the earned income tax
and retirement contributions system in isolation are progressive and more so when
incentivizing delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role.
These sets of results are presented and elaborated upon in Appendix B.2.1.
Now, I focus on the insurance role of the retirement benefits system. Figure
8 plots how the lifetime replacement rate, i.e, the NPV of retirement benefits as
31A caveat is warranted. The history of taxes, retirement contributions, and retirement ben-
efits jointly determine consumption and income realizations at every point in time. Therefore,
the effect of one instrument on any particular allocation cannot be isolated. However, since in
the implementation of Proposition 5 savings taxes are set to deter private savings, and earned
income taxes and benefits deter from off-equilibrium allocations, in equilibrium, the realizations
of consumption before retirement equal to income after earned income taxes and retirement
contributions, and consumption after retirement equals to retirement benefits. I focus on the
degree of insurance in these equilibrium allocations.
36
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
−40 %
−30 %
−20 %
−10 %
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
Age
A
ve
ra
ge
ea
rn
ed
in
co
m
e
ta
x
ra
te
A
φ = 0.4
φ = -0.7
58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76
0 $
10,000 $
20,000 $
30,000 $
40,000 $
50,000 $
60,000 $
70,000 $
80,000 $
Retirement Age
P
en
si
on
an
n
u
it
ie
s
B
φ = 0.4
φ = -0.7
Figure 7: Average earned income tax rate (Panel A): labor income tax plus payroll
tax as a fraction of contemporaneous income. Average earned income taxes are
hump-shaped in age and are smaller when φ = 0.4. Pension annuities (Panel
B): average yearly retirement benefits for each retirement age group. Retirement
benefits are increasing in retirement age and more so when φ = 0.4.
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a fraction of the NPV of labor income, evolves depending on the realizations of
the NPV of labor income, for φ = 0.4 (Panel A) and φ = −0.7 (Panel B). When
incentivizing delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role,
the lifetime replacement rate decreases in lifetime labor income realizations and
vice versa. Quantitatively, the population average of the elasticity of the NPV of
retirement benefits with respect to the NPV of lifetime income is 0.85, less than
1, for φ = 0.4 (Panel A) and 1.14, greater than 1, for φ = −0.7 (Panel B). Retire-
ment benefits provide more insurance when incentivizing delayed retirement has a
positive redistributive and insurance role. In isolation, retirement benefits feature
a form of progressivity in lifetime incomes when incentivizing delayed retirement
has a positive redistributive and insurance role and regressivity otherwise. This is
reminiscent of the short-run progressivity of the net retirement wedge when φ > 0,
which our simulations suggest, holds true in the long-run. The net present value
of lifetime incomes is not however, a perfect summary of the long-run and the
history of incomes. The income history–contingent nature of benefits is clearly
seen in the dispersion of the lifetime replacement rate at a given NPV of lifetime
incomes: in the constrained optimum post-retirement consumption depends on
the full past history of incomes in slightly non-linear ways.
After analyzing the earned income tax and retirement contribution system, on
the one hand, and the retirement benefits system, on the other hand, I study their
interaction through the actuarial role of the retirement benefits, earned income
taxes, and retirement contributions. The social insurance system is actuarially
favorable to an individual if his lifetime retirement benefit net of earned income
taxes and retirement contributions is positive. Figure 9 plots how the lifetime
actuarial rate, i.e. the NPV of retirement benefits minus earned income taxes
and retirement contributions as a fraction of the NPV of labor income evolves
depending on the realizations of the NPV of labor income, for φ = 0.4 (Panel
A) and φ = −0.7 (Panel B). In terms of levels, the social insurance system is
always actuarially more favorable to low earners and actuarial unfavorable to high
earners. In relative terms, the elasticity of the NPV of benefits nets of taxes and
contributions with respect to the NPV of lifetime income is −0.47 for φ = 0.4
(Panel A) and −0.39 φ = −0.7 (Panel B). As we have seen that he retirement
benefits are progressive in lifetime incomes when incentivizing delayed retirement
has a positive redistributive and insurance role, so is the social insurance system on
net more actuarially favorable to agents with low lifetime incomes when φ = 0.4.
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Figure 8: Lifetime replacement rate: NPV of retirement benefits as a fraction
of the NPV of labor income plotted against NPV of labor income realizations.
Retirement benefits are progressive in lifetime incomes and provide more insurance
when incentivizing delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance
role (Panel A) φ = 0.4.
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Figure 9: Lifetime actuarial rate: NPV of retirement benefits minus earned
income taxes and retirement contributions as a fraction of the NPV of labor income
plotted against NPV of labor income realizations. The social insurance system is
always actuarially more favorable to low earners, and more so when incentivizing
delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role (Panel A) φ =
0.4.
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6.1.2 Comparison with Existing Retirement Benefits Systems
Government pension systems that provide retirement benefits are present in vir-
tually all countries in the world (see Gruber and Wise (1998) and Blundell et al.
(2016) for an overview). The German chancellor Otto Von Bismarck first in-
troduced an old-age social insurance program in 1889 because “those who are
disabled from work by age and invalidity have a well-grounded claim to care from
the state”. Subsequently, the UK economist William Beveridge argued in 1909
that it is costly for older workers to cope with rapid technological change (Costa
(1998)). These two seminal programs reflect the notion of a retirement benefits
system insuring against depreciated skills and old-age disability; however, they
provided insurance to a various degree. On the one hand, the Bismarckian sys-
tem was a compulsory scheme for blue-collar workers below an income threshold,
which levied contributions on both employees and employers and paid benefits on
an earnings-related basis. Over the years, it expanded to include the entire Ger-
man workforce. The system was adapted and applied in Italy and Spain (1919),
Belgium (1924), France (1930), Portugal (1935), and Switzerland (1948). On the
other hand, the Beveridgian system levied contributions from general tax revenues
and paid a flat rate pension to all over a certain age subject to a needs test. This
system proved equally popular and was adopted in New Zealand (1898), the UK,
including Ireland (1908), Australia (1908), Canada (1927), and Norway (1936).
For most developed countries, public pension schemes are Defined Benefit in
nature. In these schemes, retirement benefits are a function of the flexible age at
which the individual begins claiming benefits and earnings when working (as well
as other factors, such as marital status). Although the precise details of these
public pension schemes differ across countries, many share common features with
my proposed implementation. First, in most countries, there is no mandatory re-
tirement age, and retirement benefits increase as workers delay claiming them. By
continuing to work and contribute to the system, individuals can accrue entitle-
ment to a higher future pension income and adjustments for late claiming. There
is typically a greater incentive to continue working while it is still possible to ac-
crue additional rights. In many countries, the ability to accrue additional rights
ceases at some pivot age, referred to as the normal retirement age. Historically,
many European systems raised annual benefits little, if at all, for those who chose
to delay claiming benefits past the normal retirement age.32 This was the case in
32Many but not all European schemes have had normal pension ages that are earlier than in
the US. In 2014, the average normal pension age across OECD countries was 64.0 years for men
and 63.1 years for women, whereas it was 66 in the US. However, there is considerable variation
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Germany until 1997 and remains the case in Spain. However, an increasing num-
ber of countries have started to impose some actuarial adjustment, although the
levels of these vary significantly. At one extreme, Australia and the Netherlands
continue to offer no increase in future benefit income to those who delay claim-
ing. At the other extreme, until April 2016, the UK offered individuals a 10.4%
increase in benefits for each year of delayed claiming beyond the state pension
age (now reduced to 5.4%). Second, as the historical background on Bismarckian
and Beveridgian systems showed, most public pension schemes have an insurance
aspect.33 The insurance aspect of pension schemes is particularly progressive and
significant for those with low income. European pensions typically provide higher
replacement rates than the US SS system (Duval (2004)). For example, public
pensions in Spain replace on average 80% of pre-retirement income, whereas it is
closer to 42% for the US ( Toossi (2015)). European pension schemes also tend
to be more progressive. The Netherlands, Spain, and the UK all have a mini-
mum benefit level that is higher than in the US. Third, the actuarial value of a
retiree’s benefits rarely equals the actuarial value of the taxes paid while working,
especially at low incomes.
There are two differences between the optimal retirement benefits system pro-
posed in our implementation and real-world pension systems. First, benefits are
optimally a function of the age of exit of the labor force. Although retirement pen-
sions impose an early and normal34 age typically referred to as retirement ages,
in some countries, these ages simply relate to the date at which benefits can be
claimed and have a weak relationship to employment. In many countries, individ-
uals can draw benefits and work at the same time with little penalty. However, in
some countries, pensioners have their benefits reduced if they have income from
earnings, often referred to as an “earnings test.” This earnings test reduces the
incentive to work once a person claims retirement benefits. An extreme example
is Australia, where benefits are withdrawn at a 50% rate of earnings above an
earnings threshold. Gelber et al. (2020) estimate that the earnings test reduces
across countries. The lowest early retirement ages in the OECD are 58.0 years for women in
Turkey and 58.7 years for men in Slovenia. The highest normal retirement age in the OECD is
67 for men and women in Norway and Iceland. Many developed countries are in the process of
increasing their early and normal retirement ages. Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
and the UK are all in the process of increasing (or have recently increased) the early and/or
normal retirement ages in their public pension schemes.
33This paper focuses on intragenerational insurance. There is additional intergenerational
insurance in most public pension plans that are pay-as-you-go systems, where taxes collected
from the working young are used to finance current retirees’ benefits.
34In many countries such as Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the UK do not
have separate early and normal retirement ages.
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the labor force participation rate of Americans aged 63-64 by 3.3pp. However,
several countries like the UK (in 1989) and the US (in 2000 for earnings after
the normal retirement age) have abolished the earnings test. Second, the optimal
benefits depend not only on a summary statistic of the history of past income,
such as the NPV of income but rather on the whole history of incomes. Most
countries (US, France, Germany, Japan, etc.) provide benefits that are indeed
history-dependent. However, these benefits are mostly indexed on an average of
past incomes. The numerical analysis below shows that the gain from full history-
dependent policies, relative to a mix of simpler retirement policies that are linear
in past incomes and history-independent (but age-dependent) linear taxes, is not
very large for the calibration chosen. This implies that retirement benefits that
are linear in past incomes might be close to optimal provided that they increase
adequately with retirement age.
6.2 Implementation with a Simple Social Security Pro-
gram
When can one reduce the history dependence of the optimal policies proposed
above? In this subsection, I show that in the limit case of workers who are risk-
neutral in consumption, optimal policies can be implemented by a retirement
benefit system that looks similar to the US SS system (depends on lifetime income
and retirement age) and a history-independent labor income tax. To construct
this implementation, I proceed in two steps. First, I construct retirement-age-
dependent post-retirement transfers that replicate the effects of the retirement
wedge. Given optimal hours and said transfers, the agent’s private retirement
decision would coincide with the optimal retirement decision. Second, using these
post-retirement transfers and labor wedge, I construct a SS system and history-
independent income tax that implement the optimum.
6.2.1 The Retirement Wedge as Post-Retirement Transfers
Recall from Section 4.3 that if agents are risk neutral in consumption, then con-
sumption is undistorted and the labor wedge at age t is simply equal to the time
zero labor wedge τ tL({θ
t}) = τ 0L(θ0), where τ
0
L(θ0) is determined by the govern-
ment’s redistributive motive in the initial period. Lemma 5 in Appendix A.12
gives general conditions on the distribution of initial heterogeneity such that there
exist government Pareto weights that rationalize a constant optimal labor wedge,
τ tL({θ
t}) = τL. In particular, these conditions are satisfied if initial productivity is
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Pareto-distributed for a range of social welfare functions, from utilitarian (labor
wedge equal to zero), to Rawlsian (largest labor wedge), to a Rawlsian-utilitarian
mixture (intermediate levels of labor wedge).35
If the government sets a flat labor income tax equal to τ and a post-retirement
transfer π is a function of retirement age, then the agent chooses hours conditional
on work optimally yt = y
∗
t and his private retirement decision satisfies:
max
ν
E
{∫ ν
0
e−ρt
[
(1− τ)y∗t − h(
y∗t
θt
)− φ(θt)
]
dt+ e−ρνπ(ν)
}
(19)
The planner’s choice of the optimal retirement decision is different from the agent’s
private choice in two aspects. First, because of labor income taxes, the govern-
ment values output relative to the fixed cost more than the agent. Second, the
government wants to distort the fixed cost faced by the agent due to the redistribu-
tive value of the net retirement wedge. The transfer π implements the optimal
retirement decision if T ∗R is a solution to the agent’s private retirement decision
problem (19).
Under assumption 1, I construct π by evaluating the agent’s expected utility
at the productivity process reflected at the second-best l retirement cut-off θ∗R(t).
Intuitively, the reflected productivity is a process that equals productivity as long
as the it stays above the cut-off. Once productivity falls below the cut-off and
the planner would want the agent to retire, the reflected process follows its own
dynamics and is defined to stay above the cut-off at all times. Appendix A.13
provides the formal mathematical definition of reflected processes and proves the
proposition below.
Proposition 6. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Define {θ˜t}t the reflected process
above θ∗R(t) then
π(t) = Et
{∫ T
t
e−ρs
[
[(1− τ)y˜∗s − h(
y˜∗s
θ˜s
)− φ(θ˜s)
]
ds
}
implements the second-best retirement decision, where y˜∗t = (1− τ)
ε θ˜
1+ε
t
κε(1+ε)
.
The transfer achieves to implement the second-best retirement decision by
doing the following. First, when the net retirement wedge and labor wedge result
in distortions for delayed (resp. early) retirement, the planner provides a marginal
change in the transfer that increases (resp. decreases) the option value of continued
35If the distribution is Pareto with shape parameter a on [θ,∞) and the government puts
weight αθ at θ and equal weights on (θ,∞), then the labor wedge is τL =
1
a
αθ
1+αθ
. The labor
wedge is τL = 0 if αθ = 0 (utilitarian), and τ =
1
2a if αθ = 1 (Rawlsian), and is increasing in αθ.
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work of the agent until (resp. after) productivity falls to θ∗R(t). Proposition 6 states
that the marginal change in the optimal transfer is the agent’s private value of
work at a level of labor income that is constrained to stay above the level of labor
income that triggers retirement in the second-best. In particular, if π implements
T ∗R , then a lump-sum transfer added to π implements T
∗
R . This will allow us
to complement any smooth history-independent labor income tax with a history-
dependent retirement benefit and a lump-sum transfer to implement the optimum.
Proposition 7. Let T (yt) be a differentiable history-independent labor income tax,
there exists retirement benefits b and a lump-sum transfer t0 such that (T, b, t0)
implements the optimum. In addition,
b(ν, {yt}) = δ(ν) E
{∫ T ∗R
0
e−ρtτy∗t )
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
level around second best
+ π(ν)− δ(ν)E[e−ρT
∗
Rπ(T ∗R )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
deferral rate
+ f({ys})︸ ︷︷ ︸
function of past earnings
for any retirement age ν.Where e−ρT
∗
Rf({ys}) =
∫
T ∗R
0
e−ρt[T (yt)−τyt]dt and δ(t) ≡
1−e−ρ(T−t)
1−e−ρT
is the lifetime equivalent of a stream of unit of consumption from time
t until death.
6.2.2 Comparison with the US Social Security Program
This implementation gives an explicit formula for the retirement benefits similar
to the US SS benefits that have three components.
Thirst term on the right hand side of Proposition 7 captures that the benefits
are defined around a common level at the second-best. This level affects the overall
replacement rate of the SS system. It is linked to the taxes collected to fund the
system and aggregate output. The US Social Security Old-Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance (OASDI) program and Medicare’s Hospital Insurance (HI)
program are financed primarily by payroll taxes through the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act tax. Box workers and firms pay a SS tax of 6.2% up to $132,700
of income and a 1.45% tax for Medicare, resulting in a total payroll tax of 15.3%.
The overall SS benefits level adjusts with inflation through COLAs (cost of living
adjustments) that are indexed on the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage
Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).
Second, benefits adjust with a deferral rate using the transfers π that guarantee
that the planner provides a marginal change in the benefits that equalizes the
private and public the option value of continued work at the second-best retirement
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age. This is reminiscent of the actuarial adjustments in the US SS benefits between
the EEA and age 70 (the actuarial reduction factor and the delayed retirement
credits before the FBA) discussed in Section 5.2. Figure 10 contrasts the actuarial
adjustment rate of the US SS system with the average actuarial adjustment rate in
the optimum of our two simulations. The optimal adjustment rates increase faster
when incentivizing delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance
role (φ = 0.4). In particular, the optimal adjustment rates are larger and more
convex than the status quo actuarial reduction factors and delayed retirement
credits. Finally, in our model, the adjustment rate can be substantial in old age
for high earners who delay retirement until age 70. A caveat is warranted. In
practice, the very top of the income distribution disposes of higher returns and a
richer set of instruments to sustain their retirement consumption. The ingredients
of our model (log-normal productivity, savings in a risk-free asset) are set to
tease out the policy implications of endogenous retirement for the vast majority
of workers who rely on SS as a significant source of income in retirement.
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Figure 10: Actuarial adjustment rate of Social Security
Third, benefits at the optimal retirement age, net of the overall level, are a
simple function f({ys}|T
∗
R ) of past earnings until some target retirement age. In
particular, if the tax function T in our second implementation is linear, benefits at
the optimal retirement age are linear in the NPV of past incomes. The Averaged
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) is the equivalent of the NPV of past incomes
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in the US SS system with the difference that the average is over the 35 highest-
earning years. Our second implementation states that if the tax system is linear,
a Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) that is linear in the NPV of past incomes can
implement the optimum. This result is specific to the quasilinear in consumption
utility function specification. But as we see in the next subsection, with history-
independent (but age-dependent), linear taxes, retirement benefits that are linear
in past incomes might be close to optimal provided that they increase adequately
with retirement age. Suppose the tax function is HSV as in our baseline economy.
In that case, the function weights past earnings in non-linear ways, trading off
the labor supply disincentives of progressive taxes with the insurance gains of the
social insurance system. These insurance gains can be substantial with significant
risk aversion in consumption, as we see next.
6.3 Welfare Gains and Simple Age-Dependent Policies
What are the welfare gains from the optimal mechanism, and how do they compare
to from simpler, linear policies? The first row of Table 2, reports the welfare gains
from the second-best relative to the baseline economy with a parametrization of
the U.S. tax and SS system described in Section 5.2.36 The numbers represent
the constant percentage increase, at all dates and histories, in the baseline con-
sumption required to achieve the same utility as the alternative allocation. The
first column corresponds to the simulation for φ = 0.4 and the second column for
φ = 0.7. The second sub-columns correspond to our benchmark medium value for
the conditional variance of productivity σ2m = 0.0095, whereas the first and third
report simulations with a lower value and a higher value, respectively. Welfare
gains are higher when the conditional variance of productivity is larger or when
incentivizing delayed retirement has a negative insurance and redistributive value
(φ > 0). These welfare gains correspond to an upper bound on potential gains
from reforming the U.S. tax system and SS system.
Given the clear age trends in the wedges, it is natural to compare the full
optimum to simple age-dependent and retirement-age dependent policies. I take
a hint from the second-best to formulate a sensible choice of the tax and retire-
ment benefits policies. First, the policy sets the linear income tax rate, (resp.
the linear savings tax rate) at each age equal to the cross-sectional average of the
36The literature has usually compared the welfare from the second-best with the welfare
achieved in a laissez-faire economy with no taxes or subsidies. I choose a direct comparison
with the baseline US economy. This allows me to measure the long-run welfare gains after a
reform of the status quo US tax and SS system.
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Table 2: Welfare Gains from simpler tax and retirement benefits policies
φ = 0.4 φ = −0.7
Low Med. High Low Med. High
Var Var Var Var Var Var
Welfare gain from second-best (%) .61 1.13 1.32 .74 1.43 1.68
Welfare gain from linear policies (%) .55 1.04 1.25 .68 1.36 1.63
As % of second-best 89.5 91.6 94.2 92.1 95.3 96.7
Note: Low variance is σ2l = 0.00625, medium variance is σ
2
m = 0.0095 and high variance
is σ2m = 0.0161. Row 1 report the gain from the second-best, relative to the baseline US
economy, in terms of the equivalent increase in consumption after all histories. Welfare
gains are higher when the conditional variance of productivity is larger or when
incentivizing delayed retirement has a negative insurance and redistributive value
(φ > 0). Row 2 shows the gain from linear age-dependent policies relative to the
baseline US economy, while row 3 expresses this gain as a fraction of the gain from the
second-best. Age-dependent linear taxes and retirement benefits that are increasing in
claiming-age achieve a very large fraction of the welfare gain from the second-best.
labor wedge (resp. savings wedge.) The taxes are therefore age-dependent but
history-independent. Second, the retirement benefits at the Full Benefits Age of
66 are linear in the NPV of labor income. I set the coefficient of linearity equal
to the cross-sectional average replacement rate of the annuity value of lifetime in-
come at the Full Benefits Age. The retirement benefits remain, therefore, history-
dependent but are linear in lifetime incomes as a summary statistic. Between the
EEA and age 70, retirement benefits evolve at the average adjustment rates in
the second-best. The retirement benefits are, therefore increase in claiming-age.
It is worth noting that this policy is not equivalent to increasing the Full Benefits
Age. Indeed, a 1-year increase in the Full Benefits Age corresponds to a uniform
decrease of the actuarial reduction factor by -6.67pp and a uniform increase of the
delayed retirement credits by 8pp, while the adjustment rate is steep and convex
in the optimum (Figure 10). Given the number of periods and the presence of
three instruments, it is numerically challenging to optimize over age-dependent
tax rates and history-dependent retirement benefits precisely. Hence, this experi-
ment delivers a lower bound for the welfare gains. It turns out, however, that even
this lower bound is very tight. The third row in Table 2 shows that welfare gains as
a fraction of the second-best gains range from 89.5 percent for a low-variance and
high φ case to 96.7 percent for a high-variance and low φ scenario. This suggests
that—for these particular calibrations—the fully history-dependent policies can
be informative about simple linear taxes and retirement policies that are linear in
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incomes, and that increase benefits with the retirement age.
7 Extensions and Discussion
This section discusses which of the models assumptions are necessary for its key
results and briefly presents extensions developed in Appendix A. The paper’s main
contributions as threefold:
First, are the economic insights on the forces that drive optimal policies, e.g.,
the sign (negative wedge when incentivizing delayed retirement has a positive
redistributive and insurance role), evolution and age-dependency of the net retire-
ment wedge, the principle of wedge smoothing, and the progressivity or regressivity
of the net retirement wedge. Even though the results on the savings wedge de-
pend on the separability between consumption and labor, the qualitative results
on the retirement wedge and labor wedge carry through in the case with home
production or complementary in consumption and leisure, an extension developed
in Appendix A.15.
Second, tractability in the retirement decision allows for a closed-form solution
of the retirement behavior in the first-best. There is an option value of waiting
for higher productivity shocks before retirement. This option value decreases with
age. Therefore, the implicit labor supply elasticity over the extensive margin
increases with age. For these results, I assume that retirement is irreversible and
that the fixed cost of staying in the labor market for highly productive workers
cannot be too large relative to lowly productive workers (Technical Assumption
1). The qualitative results remain unchanged if agents can reenter the labor force
at a lower wage (due to search costs or depreciation of skills). Quantitatively, I
truncate the bottom quantile (and top centile) of the productivity distribution
to have a finite distribution and guarantee that Technical Assumption 1 holds
numerically for Simulation A with a slowly-increasing fixed cost of staying in the
labor market. For completeness, an extension in Appendix. A.15 shows that when
the fixed cost of staying in the labor market for highly productive workers is very
large compared to that of lowly productive workers, it becomes optimal for highly
productive workers to retire early.
Third, I provide two ways to implement the planner’s optimal allocations in
a decentralized economy. The first implementation is through retirement benefits
contingent on the history of income until retirement, together with a history-
independent savings tax and a history-dependent tax on labor income. Impor-
tantly, this implementation does not rely on the separability between consumption
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and labor. The second implementation is through a smooth history-independent
tax on labor income, a lump-sum transfer, and retirement benefits closely resem-
bling the US SS system. In particular, the optimum can be implemented with
a linear labor income tax and SS benefits that are linear in the NPV of past in-
comes. This second implementation relies on risk neutrality in consumption. Both
implementations guide us in finding simpler tax and retirement benefits policies
that achieve the bulk of welfare gains from more elaborate second-best policies.
Home production and Complementary in Consumption and Leisure
Saez (2002) argues that the non-separability in consumption and leisure is im-
portant to study optimal income taxation while Hurst (2008) emphasizes the im-
portance of home production for the observed drop in consumption expenditure
at retirement. It is well known that with non-separability between consumption
and leisure the Inverse Euler equation and the no savings tax result of Atkin-
son and Stiglitz (1976) do not hold. The reason is that income and productivity
now directly affect the intertemporal rate of substitution for consumption. In-
tertemporal distortions allow to separate types and relax incentive constraints. In
Appendix A.15, I relax the assumption of separable intensive preferences in con-
sumption and labor. by considering Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences. The
dynamics of the net retirement wedge and labor wedge, and the insights on the
first and second-best retirement behavior remain unchanged. Consumption after
retirement however drops in the first-best, baseline and decentralized economies,
consistent with Hurst (2008).
Uncertain Lifetime and the Correlation of Life Expectancy and Income
There is empirical evidence that life expectancy is positively correlated with in-
come.Chetty et al. (2016) find that in the United States, between 2001-2014, the
gap in life expectancy between the richest 1% and poorest 1% of individuals is
14.6 years. In Appendix A.15, I relax the assumption of fixed death at age 80 and
introduce stochastic lifetime positively correlated with income. In this situation,
the planner can take advantage of the fact that highly productive agents have
longer life expectancy than the general population in order to give them lower
retirement consumption and lower NPV of consumption compared to a model in
which agents uniformly life at the average life expectancy.
Health, Liquidity, and Intergenerational Transfers Both health and em-
ployment decline as people age. Thus, it seems natural to suspect that health
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declines are one cause of exits from the labor force in old age. There are several
reasons why I might expect health to impact retirement behavior. First, declining
health makes work less pleasant. Second, it can reduce an individual’s productivity
and, thus, the individual’s wage. Third, health shocks might reduce life expectancy
and the savings that an individual needs for retirement. Health appears to affect
employment rates more than hours worked. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence
on the effect of health on employment rates is modest. The fraction of individuals
who report bad health rises from 20% at age 55 to 37% by age 70. French (2005)
shows that this decline in health would lead to a 7 pp drop in the employment
rate, and would explain a small share of the drop in participation rates from 87%
to 13% between ages 55 and 70. For this reason, I abstracted away from health as
a separate exogenous shock that can affect wages and the fixed cost of staying in
the labor market. However, an alternative interpretation of the model can allow
to think of health shocks by reinterpreting θt as a composite of productivity and
health shocks. It is, nonetheless, important for future research to think of health
shocks for joint design the design of Medicare and Social Security.
Liquidity constraints are another concern due to the importance of housing
wealth for the elderly and the fact that workers cannot borrow against future ben-
efits. If public pensions crowd out private savings that would otherwise have been
more liquid, they may delay retirement. Understanding the quantitative impor-
tance of liquidity effects is difficult because pension schemes are complex. Individ-
uals are likely to be affected by incentives from many different public programs and
private pension schemes at the same time. Therefore, I chose to allow agents to
borrow against their post-retirement transfers as in Grochulski and Kocherlakota
(2010). The evolution and increase in post-retirement consumption as a function
of retirement arises naturally. There is no forced-saving element in the social in-
surance system. In the quantitative exercise, log utility of consumption implies
that agents never hit their borrowing limit since they consume a fixed share of
their NPV of income. Therefore, assets in our model should be interpreted as the
risk-free equivalent of all the savings vehicles at the disposal of workers to plan
for retirement (housing, 401(k), standard IRA, and Roth IRA, etc.) adjusted for
shadow liquidity and early withdrawal costs.
Finally, by focusing on insurance across one cohort or one person’s lifetime, I
abstracted from intergenerational transfers and issues of funding Social Security
over the long-run (cf. Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and Hosseini and Shourideh
(2019)). As long as government debt can be kept stable and constant, our solution
corresponds to the steady equilibrium of the corresponding overlapping genera-
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tions model. In addition, one can reinterpret my life cycle model as a dynastic
household, with persistence in productivities. This paper contributes to under-
standing how endogenous retirement affects the optimal design of social insurance
over the life cycle. Further examining the interplay between intragenerational and
intergenerational insurance will be essential to resolve the issue of funding Social
Security in the long-run and is left for future research.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies optimal retirement, labor, and savings distortions in a life cycle
model with an intensive margin of labor supply and an endogenous retirement
age. The government insures individuals who privately observe persistent wage
shocks. In this environment, the following insights refine our prior understanding
of social insurance over the life cycle: (i) the optimal retirement distortions provide
stronger incentives for delayed retirement with age when high wage workers do not
disproportionately benefit from continued work, (ii) the optimal labor distortions
are slightly hump-shaped in old-age, unlike in existing dynamic models with no
endogenous retirement choice, in which they are everywhere increasing, and (iii)
savings become undistorted between the last work-year and retirement, and remain
undistorted after retirement.
The optimal allocations can be decentralized with retirement benefits that
share similar features with many public pension programs worldwide. These re-
tirement benefits are contingent on the history of income until retirement. In
particular, the benefits are progressive in lifetime incomes when incentivizing de-
layed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role. Besides, the
social insurance system is always actuarially more favorable to low earners than
high earners, and more so when incentivizing delayed retirement has a positive
redistributive and insurance role. When risk aversion is small, a simple Social
Security program similar to the US Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) program can decentralize the optimum. In particular, the Social Se-
curity benefits increase with retirement age and guarantee a marginal change in
the benefits that equalizes the private and public option values of continued work
exactly at the constrained efficient retirement age. In numerical simulations, a
simple combination of retirement benefits that are linear in lifetime incomes and
that increase with retirement age, along with age-dependent linear taxes, achieve
almost the entire welfare gain from the constrained optimum for the calibrations
studied. Further numerical work, and a conceptual framework for assessing the
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interplay between complexity and approximate optimality in policies, could shed
light on whether this result remains true with different preferences, especially with
higher risk aversion.
As life expectancies have risen over the past century, accounting for retirement
- an endogenous labor supply decision - is of first-order importance for social
insurance. The theory proposed in this paper leads to two open empirical questions
that are important in quantifying optimal policies. Empirical estimates of the fixed
time and monetary costs of work, and their heterogeneity across time and worker
characteristics, would improve the calibration of macro models to match micro
evidence on extensive margin elasticities. Furthermore, an empirical estimate of
the mean and variance of hourly wages among full-time workers age 60-75 would
help quantify wage inequality among older workers.
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Appendix For Online Publication
Part I
A - Analytic Appendix
1 First-Best: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The planner’s problem is
max
{λ,ct,lt,TR}
E
{∫ T
0
e−ρs[u(ct)− λct]dt+
∫
TR
0
e−ρs[λθtlt − κ
(lt)
1+ 1
ε
1 + ε
− φt(θt)]dt
}
subject to the law of motion of productivity (1). From the optimal allocations
u′(c) = λ and κl
1
ε
t = λθt, denote E
{∫ T
0
e−ρs[u(ct) − λct]dt
}
= h(λ). Then the
above objective rewrites as
max
{λ,TR}
h(λ) + E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt[λ1+ε
(θt)
1+ε
κε(1 + ε)
− φt(θt)]dt
}
.
Denote a maximizer by λ∗. By an envelope condition, the expected change in the
payoff if retirement is delayed an infinitesimal short time is λ∗1+ε
(θt)
1+ε
κε(1 + ε)
− φt(θt).
Taking ψ < λ
∗1+ε
κε
in the condition of growth bounded from above of φt(θ) in
Proposition 1 or assuming that G is high enough such that marginal utility of
consumption λ∗1+ε is high and the inequality holds, then the expected change
in payoff is increasing in productivity. The dynamic single crossing condition in
Strack and Kruse (2013) holds and Theorem 4.3 of Jacka and Lynn (1992) implies
that the shape of the stopping region (retirement rule) is determined by a time-
varying threshold.
Note that when φt is independent of productivity, or nonincreasing in pro-
ductivity, the “bounded growth from above” condition in the Proposition holds,
implying Proposition 1.
2 First-Best: Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. To qualify results further, I now consider agents who are risk neutral in
consumption, so that u(ct) = ct. Consumption is not pinned down by the Euler
equation. I eliminate consumption from the planner’s problem by replacing the
1
resource constraint into the planner’s social welfare function:
w ≡ max
TR
E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt[θtl
fb
t − κ
(lfbt )
1+ 1
ε
1 + 1
ε
− φ(θt)]dt
}
−G (20)
subject to the law of motion of productivity (1). Normalizing government spending
to zero, G = 0, and replacing the first-best labor allocations using the optimality
condition κ(lfbt )
1
ε = θt, the social welfare function w(θt, t) satisfies the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
0 = max
{
−w(θ, t), −ρw(θ, t)+
θ1+ε
κε(1 + ε)
−φ(θt)+(µtθ)∂θw(θ, t)+
σ2t θ
2
2
∂θθw(θ, t)+∂tw(θ, t)
}
.
(21)
The terms to the right of −ρw(θ, t) consist of the marginal social value of labor
minus the fixed cost and derivatives of social welfare with respect to time and
productivity.
Now consider the case of productivity that evolves according to a GBM, i.e.,
µt and σt are, respectively, constants µ and σ. I show that even when the fixed
cost is a constant φ(t) = φ, there is an option value of waiting for higher pro-
ductivity shocks before retirement. In addition, this option value decreases over
time. Therefore, even when the fixed cost is constant over time, the elasticity over
the retirement margin increases over time. Hence, the extensive margin elasticity
of labor supply increases over time, despite the intensive Frisch elasticity and the
fixed cost being time-independent.
Consider the infinite horizon model, T = +∞. To ensure convergence of social
welfare, I assume
ρ > (1 + ε)(µ+
1
2
σ2ε). (22)
Social welfare is now time-independent and replacing the HJB equation in this
setting is
max{0− w(θ),−ρw(θ) + µθwθ +
σ2θ2
2
wθθ +
θ1+ε
κε(1 + ε)
− φ(θ)}. (23)
I conjecture that the solution is of the following form: there is a threshold θfbR such
that an agent is retired if and only if his productivity falls below the threshold
θt ≤ θ
fb
R . This implies that w(θ) = 0 for all θ ≤ θ
fb
R and for θ > θ
fb
R , w is a
nonnegative solution to the equation
− ρw(θ) + µθwθ +
σ2θ2
2
wθθ = −
θ1+ε
κε(1 + ε)
+ φ(θ) (24)
2
Moreover, w must be C1 on its entire domain. This implies that w(θfbR ) = 0 a
value matching condition and wθ(θ
fb
R ) = 0, a smooth pasting condition. Finally,
observe that, for θ ≤ θfbR , the second term in the right hand side of (23) implies
that
θ1+ε
κε(1 + ε)
≤ φ(θ) i.e. at retirement and afterward, the marginal social value
of continued work is negative. In particular θˆfbR ≤ θS.
Set φ1θ
1+εφ + φ0 with εφ < ε. Define the quadratic polynomial P (x) = −ρ +
µx+ σ
2
2
x(x− 1). The homogeneous equation
− ρw(θ) + µθwθ +
σ2θ2
2
wθθ = 0 (25)
admits the general solution
w(θ) = C−θ
x− + C+θ
x+ (26)
in which x− and and x+ are the negative and positive roots of P . I find a
particular solution for each non-homogenous term, respectively denoted Aθ1+ε,
A′θ1+εφ , and B in which A = −
1
κε(1 + ε)P (1 + ε)
, A′ =
φ1
P (1 + εφ)
and B = −
φ
ρ
.
By the assumption in (22), P (1 + ε) < 0. The sum of these particular solutions
Aθ1+ε + A′θ1+εφ +B is the value of social welfare if agents never retire.
By the superposition principle of linear homogenous ODEs the solution takes
the form
w(θ) = Aθ1+ε + A′θ1+εφ +B + C−θ
x− + C+θ
x+ (27)
for θ > θfbR and w(θ) = 0 for θ ≤ θ
fb
R . From (22) I ensure that x+ > 1 + ε. Since
lfb − κ (l
fb)1+
1
ε
1+ 1
ε
=
θ1+ε
κε(1 + ε)
I can conjecture that w(θ) =θ→+∞ O(θ
1+ε). Therefore
C+ = 0.
By the value matching and smooth pasting conditions:
A(θfbR )
1+ε + A′(θfbR )
1+εφ +B + C−(θ
fb
R )
x− = 0 (28)
(1 + ε)A
(θfbR )
1+εφ
θfbR
+ (1 + εφ)A
′ (θ
fb
R )
1+εφ
θfbR
+ x−C−
(θfbR )
x−
θfbR
= 0. (29)
Multiplying (28) by x− and (29) by θ
fb
R and subtracting the two yields
(1 + ε− x−)A(θ
fb
R )
1+ε + (1 + εφ − x−)A
′(θfbR )
1+εφ = x−B. (30)
When εφ = ε the caution becomes simply
(1 + ε− x−)(A+ A
′)(θfbR )
1+ε = x−B.
3
Setting A(φ1) = A + A
′, Thus the expression of θfbR and w in Corollary 1 follows
by replacing the values of A(φ1) and B.
θfbR =
(φ0
ρ
x
A(φ1)(1 + ε+ x)
) 1
ε
. (31)
and the static participation threshold is
θS = (
φ0
[κε(1 + ε)]−1 − φ1
)
1
ε
Both θfbR and θS increasing in φ0 and in φ1, . In addition, since
ρ−(1+ε)(µ+σ
2
2
ε)
ρ
< 1
and (x)
(1+ε+x)
< 1, I get θfbR < θS. Now in finite horizon, the problem is time
dependent and thresholds are time dependent. When time goes to T , the value
of waiting for productivity to improve decreases and thresholds converge to θ∗.
Only the dynamic single crossing property of the derivative operator is needed in
finite horizon for this to hold. This is again an application of Jacka and Lynn
(1992).
3 The First Order Approach
3.1 First Order Approach under Risk Neutrality
I first introduce the First Order Approach (FOA) in the simpler setting in which
agents are risk neutral in consumption and productivity is a GBM. I relax incentive
compatibility by considering a family of deviations that Bergemann and Strack
(2015) call consistent deviations. The effect of these deviations on promised utility
can be summarized by what Pavan et al. (2014) call the impulse response function.
This FOA is standard in the dynamic contracting literature with persistent shocks.
The value of the agent’s productivity if he reports his productivity truthfully
is
θt = θ0 exp((µ−
σ2
2
)t+ σBt).
I define Φ by θt ≡ Φ(t, θ0, Bt) and set the following definition, which is motivated
by Bergemann and Strack (2015).
Definition 2. (Consistent deviations). A deviation is called consistent if an agent,
with real productivity θt = Φ(t, θ0, Bt) and associated initial shock θ0, misreports
his initial shock by announcing θ˜0 ∈ Θ0 at t = 0 and continues to misreport
θ˜t = Φ(t, θ˜0, Bt) instead of his true productivity θt at all future dates t ≤ T .
With this definition, an agent who follows a consistent deviation misreports his
4
true type in all future periods. An agent’s reported productivity θ˜t = Φ(t, θ˜0, Bt)
would be equal to the productivity he would have had if his initial shock had been
θ˜0 instead of θ0. From these misreports, the planner can infer the true realized
path of Brownian shocks Bt. However, since the allocations depend on the history
of productivities instead of the Brownian shocks, the inference on the Brownian
shocks is not of immediate use for the principal. Bergemann and Strack (2015)
show that incentive compatibility with respect to consistent deviations—which is
a one-dimensional class of deviations—is sufficient for full incentive compatibility
in the risk-neutral and GBM case. This result allows me to derive the incentive-
compatible optimal allocations and retirement distortions.
Consider the ex-ante utility at time 0 of an agent with initial productivity θ0
who announces θ˜0 and follows consistent deviations; denoting it v(θ0, θ˜0). Then
v(θ0, θ˜0) = E
{θ˜}
{∫ T
0
e−ρtct(θ˜0)dt−
∫
TR(θ˜0)
0
e−ρt[κ
(
yt(θ˜0)
Φ(t,θ0,Bt)
)1+ 1
ε
1 + 1
ε
+φt
(
Φ(t, θ0, Bt)
)
]dt
∣∣∣θ˜0}.
(32)
Restricting attention to consistent deviations alone, the incentive problem turns
into a static one. Truthful reports at time zero are necessary for incentive com-
patibility, i.e. v(θ0) = max
θ˜0
v(θ0, θ˜0) and an envelope condition allows me to obtain
the derivative of ex-ante utility. The sensitivity of ex-ante utility with respect to
initial reports satisfies:
vθ(θ0) = E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt[(1 +
1
ε
)(
Φθ(t, θ0, Bt)
θt
)κ
(yt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
− Φθ(t, θ0, Bt)φ
′
t(θt)]dt
∣∣∣θ0}.
(33)
Φθ(t, θ0, Bt) is what Pavan et al. (2014) call the impulse response function and
Bergemann and Strack (2015) call the stochastic flow in continuous-time. Here
with GBM productivity the stochastic flow is the ratio of current productivity to
initial productivity, that is,
Φθ(t, θ0, Bt) = exp((µ−
σ2
2
)t+ σBt) = θt/θ0.
Then the incentive compatibility constraint simplifies to
vθ(θ0) =
1
θ0
E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt[(1 +
1
ε
)κ
(yt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
− θtφ
′
t(θt)]dt
∣∣∣θ0}. (34)
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3.2 First Order Approach under Risk Aversion
Here, I relax incentive compatibility by considering specific types of deviations
as in the risk neutral case. Suppose the agent has reported his type truthfully
until time t, {θ˜t} = {θt} and then decides to misreport his type. Since the
planner observes continuous reports from the agent, she can construct a process
B θ˜t from the reports that evolves according to dB
θ˜
t =
dθ˜t−µtθ˜tdt
σtθ˜t
. Under truth-
telling, B θ˜t = Bt. Therefore, the agent is restricted to reports that make B
θ˜
t a
Brownian motion. The Girsanov Theorem implies that there exist misreports −ηt
such that dBt = dB
θ˜
t + ηtdt under the measure Q of the Brownian motion B
θ˜
t and
gives the formula for the change of measure from P to Q. An incentive-compatible
mechanism must be immune to these deviations.
Lemma 3. (Sensitivity of promised utility) IC ⊆ FOA. Moreover, If an alloca-
tion {c, y, ν} ∈ FOA then there exists a process {σ∆,t} such that the sensitivity
process {∆t} has the integral form:
∆t = E
{∫ TR
t
e−ρs[µs∆s + uθ(cs,
ys
θs
)− φ
′
s(θs) + σ∆,sσs]ds
∣∣∣Ft} (35)
Proof. Denote {θ˜} the process reported by the agent. Let θt = θ at time t. By
Girsanov’s theorem, there exists a process {η} is adapted to Ft such that
dθ˜t = dθt + ηtdt = (θtµt + ηt)dt+ θtσtdBt. (36)
The agent’s problem is to choose controls ηt to maximize promised utility for given
allocations {c, y} and retirement rule TR. Denote {θ
η} ≡ {θ˜} the misreports
generated by {η}. Global incentive compatibility is equivalent to the fact that the
optimal report is truth-telling i.e η⋆t = 0 ∀t. Now with the FOA, assume that all
the controls ηs, ∀s ∈ [0, t) have been equal to 0 so far. Promised utility at time t
given the control η is
wt(θ, θ
η) = sup
{η}
E
{∫ TR(η)
t
e−ρ(s−t)
[
u
(
cs(η),
ys(η)
θs
)
−φs(θs)
]
ds+
∫ T
TR(η)
e−ρ(s−t)[u(cs(η), 0)]ds
∣∣∣Fηt
}
.
(37)
The expectation above is taken with respect to the realization of the process {θ˜},
since it is reports that determines the allocation and the retirement rule. If the
agent follows a process η then
dBηt =
dθηt − ((θ
η
t −
∫ t
0
ηsds)µt + ηt)dt
(θηt −
∫ t
0
ηsds)σt
(38)
forms a standard Brownian motion. Therefore, there is exists nonnegative process
6
γη and some sensitivity process Y
′η such that
dwt(θt, θ
η
t ) = (ρwt(θt, θ
η
t )− u(ct,
yt
θt
) + φt(θt))dt− γ
η
t dt+ σtY
′η
t dB
η
t .
Then replacing the standard Brownian from (38) in this equation I have
dwt(θt, θ
η
t ) = (ρwt(θt, θ
η
t )−u+φ)dt− γ
η
t dt+σtY
η
t [dθ
η
t − ((θ
η
t −
∫ t
0
ηsds)µt+ ηt)dt].
(39)
Since the dependence on past controls η = 0 is completely captured by the current
value of θη, vt = wt(θt, θ
η=0). Ito’s formula implies that
dwt(θt, θ
η
t ) = ∂twt(θt, θ
η)dt+∂θηwt(θt, θ
η
t )(θtµt+ηt)dt+∂θηwt(θt, θ
η
t )θtσtdBt+
1
2
∂2(θη)2wt(θt, θ
η
t )θ
2
t σ
2
t dt.
(40)
The equation (39) becomes with the FOA ηs = 0, ∀s ∈ [0, t):
dwt(θt, θ
η
t ) = (ρwt(θt, θ
η
t )− u(ct,
yt
θt
) + φt(θt))dt− γ
η
t dt+ θ
η
t σtY
η
t dBt.
Comparing equations (40) and (39) and equalizing their drifts yield:
∂twt(θt, θ
η
t )+∂θηwt(θt, θ
η
t )(θtµt+ηt)+
1
2
∂2(θη)2wt(θt, θ
η
t )θ
2
t σ
2
t = (ρwt(θt, θ
η
t )−u(ct,
yt
θt
)+φt(θt))dt−γ
η
t dt.
Now I obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for wt
ρwt(θt, θ
η
t ) = sup
ηt
{
∂twt(θt, θ
η)+∂θηwt(θt, θ
η
t )(θtµt+ηt)+
1
2
∂2(θη)2wt(θt, θ
η
t )θ
2
t σ
2
t+u(ct,
yt
θt
)−φt(θt)
}
.
Therefore following Theorem 3.1, p. 95 in Hartman (2002), The envelope theorem
implies37
ρ∂θwt(θt, θ
η
t ) = ∂t,θwt(θt, θ
η)+∂2θη ,θwt(θt, θ
η
t )(θtµt+ηt)+∂θηwt(θt, θ
η
t )µt+
1
2
∂3(θη)2,θwt(θt, θ
η
t )θ
2
t σ
2
t
+∂2(θη)2wt(θt, θ
η
t )θtσ
2
t + uθ(ct,
yt
θt
)− φ′t(θt).
This expression can be evaluated at ηt = 0, writing
∂wt(x,θ)
∂θ
= ∆t(x, θ) and consid-
ering the fact that when ηt = 0 I have ∂wθη(θ, θ
η) = ∆t, so that
ρ∆t = ∂t∆t+∂θ∆t(θtµt+0)+∆tµt+
1
2
∂2(θ)2(∆t)θ
2
t σ
2
t +∂θ∆tθtσ
2
t +uθ(ct,
yt
θt
)−φ′t(θt).
The Feynman-Kac formula applies to this differential equation and I deduce that
∆t = E
{∫ TR
t
e−ρs[∆sµs − uθ(cs,
ys
θs
) + φ′s(θs) + ∂θ∆sθsσ
2
s ]ds+∆TR
∣∣∣Ft}.
37For a fully rigorous argument, one needs to make regularity assumptions on TR and use
Malliavin calculus to differentiate with respect to stochastic processes. See Di Nunno et al.
(2009).
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After retirement, an optimal allocation must give constant consumption. There-
fore the sensitivity is zero at retirement. This with ∂θ∆sθs = σ∆,s, implies the
result:
∆t = E
{∫ TR
t
e−ρs[∆sµs − uθ(cs,
ys
θs
) + φ′s(θs) + σ∆,sσ
2
s ]ds
∣∣∣Ft}.
4 Recursive Formulation of Second-Best: Proof
of Lemma 1
Proof. For given consumption, output, {c, y} and retirement rule TR, the expected
utility of an agent is at time t is:
vt = E
{∫ TR
t
e−ρ(s−t)u(cs,
ys
θs
)ds+
∫ T
TR
e−ρ(s−t)u(cs, 0)ds
∣∣∣Ft}
Then
e−ρtvt+
∫ t
0
e−ρsu(cs,
ys
θs
)ds = E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρsu(cs,
ys
θs
)ds+
∫ T
TR
e−ρsu(cs, 0)ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
W
∣∣∣Ft} ≡ Wt.
By iterated expectation, Wt is a martingale. By the Martingale Representa-
tion Theorem, there exists a square integrable process such that Wt = E[W ] +∫ t
0
σ
′v
s dBs. This implies that e
−ρtvt = E[Y ]−
∫ t
0
e−ρsu(cs,
ys
θs
)ds+
∫ t
0
σ
′v
s dBs. There-
fore e−ρtvt is an Ito process. Applying Ito’s lemma,
dvt = (ρvt − u+ h)dt+ σ
v
t dBt
in which σvt = e
rtσ
′v
t . By Feynman-Kac, σ
v
t = θt∆tσt and
dvt = (ρvt − u+ h)dt+ θt∆tσtdBt
with the initial value condition
v0 = v.
The law of motion of the sensitivity process is a direct application of this idea to
Lemma (3).
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5 Recursive Formulation of Second-Best: Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman Equation
First, for the sake of legibility I drop the state 4-tuple (v,∆, θ, t) from the notation.
Denote g(t) ≡
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)ds = 1
ρ
(1− e−ρ(T−t)) a shorthand that represents by how
much constant consumption is discounted from time t until death. The associated
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to this problem is then:
0 = max
ct,yt,σ∆,t
{
−K + g(t)u−1l=0
( v
g(t)
)
, −ρK + (ct − yt) + L(v,∆, θ, t) ◦K
}
(41)
in which L(v,∆, θ, t) is the derivative operator with respect to state variables:
L(v,∆, θ, t) ◦K = Kv[ρvt − u+ φt] +K∆[(ρ− µ)∆t − uθ + φ
′
t − σ∆,tσ] +Kt +Kθθtµ+
(42)
+
1
2
Kvvθ
2
t∆
2
tσ
2 +
1
2
K∆∆σ
2
∆,tσ
2 +
1
2
Kθθθ
2
t σ
2
+Kv∆θt∆tσ∆,tσ
2 +Kvθθ
2
t∆tσ
2 +K∆θθtσ∆,tσ
2.
The first component of the right-hand side of this dynamic equation captures
that once an agent is retired with promised utility v, the cost of providing such
utility is the discounted value of the flow consumption u−1l=0(
v
g(t)
). The second com-
ponent captures the fact that before retirement, the flow cost over an infinitesimal
time dt is the discounted cost −ρKdt, flow consumption minus output, and the
derivatives of the cost function with respect to state variables. By optimality,
these should sum up to zero in the working region.
6 Optimal Labor Wedge
The evolution of the labor wedge is obtained from the evolution of γt:
Proposition 8. (Labor wedge)
The law of motion of γt, is
dγt =
[
− θtλtσc,tσ
2
t + µtγt
]
dt+ γtσtdBt, γ0 = 0.
In addition, the labor wedge satisfies
d
( τLt
1− τLt
)
= [(1 +
1
ε
)σc,t +
τLt
1− τLt
σ2c,t]σ
2
t dt−
τLt
1− τLt
σc,tσtdBt.
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Proof. Applying Ito’s lemma to yt = K∆(vt,∆t, θt, t) yields
dγt = L(vt,∆t, θt, t) ◦K∆dt+ (K∆vθt∆t +K∆∆σ∆,t +K∆θθt)σtdBt.
Using the envelope theorem, differentiate HJB with respect to ∆ to get
−ρK∆ − L(vt,∆t, θt, t) ◦K∆ + (ρ− µt)K∆ +Kvvθ
2
t∆tσ
2
t +Kv∆θtσ∆,tσ
2
t = 0
using this equation, the first order condition for σ∆,t and the expression for σc,t,
the drift of γt is (−θtλtσc,tσ
2
t dt + µtγt)dt and the volatility is γtσtdBt. Hence the
law of motion of γt.
The first order condition on yt, coupled with the law of motion of γt, implies:
d
(
λt
τLt
1− τLt
)
= [(1 +
1
ε
)λtσc,tσ
2
t ]dt. (43)
This expression states that the process λt
τLt
1−τLt
has zero instantaneous volatility.
This means that its paths are less dispersed than the paths of productivity for
insurance purposes. Applying Ito’s lemma to (43) yields:
d
( τLt
1− τLt
)
= [(1 +
1
ε
)σc,t]σ
2
t dt+
τLt
1− τLt
λtd
(
u′(ct)
)
. (44)
Apply Ito’s lemma to the Inverse Euler equation and replace d(u′(ct)) = u
′(ct)σ
2
c,tσ
2
t dt−
u′(ct)σc,tσtdBt in (44) to obtain the formula of the labor wedge in the proposition:
d
( τLt
1− τLt
)
=
[
(1 +
1
ε
)σc,t +
τLt
1− τLt
σ2c,t
]
σ2t dt−
τLt
1− τLt
σc,tσtdBt. (45)
7 Optimal Savings Wedge
Under separable utility, a standard Inverse Euler Equation of optimal contracting
and dynamic moral hazard models holds.
Proposition 9. (Savings wedge)
1. There exists a process σc,t such that
d
( 1
u′(ct)
)
=
1
u′(ct)
σc,tσtdBt (Inverse Euler Equation) (46)
2. The intertemporal wedge between t and t+ s is positive and satisfies
τKt,s =
∫ t+s
t
σ2c,t′σ
2
t dt
′
10
and the intertemporal wedge at time t is τKt = σ
2
c,tσ
2
t .
Proof. Applying Ito’s lemma to λt = Kv(vt,∆t, θt, t) yields
dλt = L(vt,∆t, θt, t) ◦Kvdt+ (Kvvθt∆t +Kv∆σ∆,t +Kvθθt)σtdBt.
Using the envelope theorem, differentiate HJB with respect to v to get −ρKv −
L(vt,∆t, θt, t) ◦ Kv + ρKv = 0, i.e L(vt,∆t, θt, t) ◦ Kv = 0. Therefore, the drift
of dλt is zero and λt is a martingale. The volatility process is determined by
σc,t = Kvvθt∆t +Kv∆σ∆,t +Kvθθt.
Point 1 states that the standard Inverse Euler Equation extends to the case with
endogenous retirement. The inverse of marginal utility of consumption is a mar-
tingale. A direct consequence of this is that the intertemporal wedge is positive,
since Jensen’s inequality applies to the inverse function that is concave.
Point 2 highlights that the intertemporal wedge τKt is linked to the volatility
of the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption. This volatility is a control
for how much the changes in productivity translate into changes in consumption.
It is, therefore, a measure of risk exposure. A high volatility of the inverse of
marginal utility of consumption implies that the planner exposes the agents to
risk to provide incentives at the expense of insurance. This risk exposure stops at
retirement and the volatility σc,t goes to zero.
38
8 Optimal Net RetirementWedge: Proof of Propo-
sition 2
The agent’s objective is
K(v) = min
{TR}
E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt(ct − yt)dt+ e
−ρTRc
T
+
R
g(TR)
}
(47)
subject to
dvt = (ρvt − u(c) + h(y/θ) + φ(θ))dt+ θt∆tσtdBt
38In Sannikov (2014), risk exposure does not go to zero at retirement. Instead, it builds up
to target, starts falling at an age before retirement, and goes to zero at the end of the horizon.
The difference is because, in my setting, there is no output after retirement, and therefore there
is no need for the agent to be exposed to risk after retirement.
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and
dθt
θt
= µtdt+ σtdBt.
The HJB is
0 = max
{
−K + g(t)u−1l=0
( v
g(t)
)
, −ρK + (ct − yt) + L
p(v, θ, t) ◦K
}
in which L(v,∆, θ, t) is the derivative operator with respect to state variables:
Llf (v, θ, t) ◦K = Kv[ρvt − u+ φt] +Kt +Kθθtµ+ (48)
+
1
2
Kvvθ
2
t∆
2
tσ
2 +
1
2
Kθθθ
2
t σ
2 ++Kvθθ
2
t∆tσ
2
But I know the HJB of the second-best planner’s problem is
Lsb(v,∆, θ, t) ◦K = Kv[ρvt − u+ φt] +Kt +Kθθtµ+ (49)
+
1
2
Kvvθ
2
t∆
2
tσ
2 +
1
2
Kθθθ
2
t σ +Kvθθ
2
t∆tσ
22
K∆[(ρ− µ)∆t − uθ + φ
′
t − σ∆,tσ] +
1
2
K∆∆σ
2
∆,tσ
2 +Kv∆θt∆tσ∆,tσ
2 +K∆θθtσ∆,tσ
2.
With the FOC on the variance of the sensitivity
−K∆σ∆,tσ +Kv∆θt∆tσ∆,tσ
2 +K∆θθtσ∆,tσ
2 = −K∆∆σ
2
∆,tσ
2
So that
Lsb(v,∆, θ, t) ◦K = Kv[ρvt − u+ φt] +Kt +Kθθtµ+ (50)
+
1
2
Kvvθ
2
t∆
2
tσ
2 +
1
2
Kθθθ
2
t σ
2
K∆[(ρ− µ)∆t − uθ + φ
′
t]−
1
2
K∆∆σ
2
∆,tσ
2.
Now this expression tells use if the planner add the wedge τL,φ in the agent’s
problem
dvt = (ρvt − u(c) + h(y/θ) + φ(θ) + τL,φ)dt+ θt∆tσtdBt
such that
τL,φ =
K∆
Kv
[(ρ− µ)∆t − uθ + φ
′
t]−
1
2Kv
K∆∆σ
2
∆,tσ
2
Then given the allocations c∗, y∗, σ∗∆ the agent’s private retirement decision will
be the same as the second-best retirement decision.
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The net wedge corrects for the terms in c∗, y∗, σ∗∆ given the Lagrangians:
τφ = τL,φ −
K∆
Kv
[(ρ− µ)∆t − uθ] +
1
2Kv
K∆∆σ
2
∆,tσ
2
Then using the FOCs on c and y
τφ =
K∆
Kv
φ
′
t =
γ
λ
φ′ = −
ǫ
1 + ǫ
τL
1− τL
θφ′(θ).
Therefore dividing by φ(θ):
τRt = −
τLt
1− τLt
ε
1 + ε
εφ,θ(θt)
9 Age-Dependency of The Retirement Wedge:
Proof of Proposition 4
From the law motion of the labor wedge
d
( τLt
1− τLt
)
= [(1 +
1
ε
)σc,t]σ
2
t dt+
τLt
1− τLt
λtd
(
u′(ct)
)
and the equilibrium relation between the net retirement wedge and labor wedge
τRt = −
τLt
1− τLt
ε
1 + ε
εφ,θ(θt)
One obtains
d(τ tR) = −
ε
1 + ε
d(
τLt
1− τLt
εφ,θ(θt))
Using Ito’s Lemma on τ tR
d(τ tR) = −
ε
1 + ε
[d(
τLt
1− τLt
)εφ,θ(θt) +
τLt
1− τLt
dεφ,θ(θt) + d(
τLt
1− τLt
)d(εφ,θ(θt))]
And on εφ,θ(θt)
dεφ,θ(θt) = [µθε
′
φ,θ(θ) +
σ2
2
θ2ε′′φ,θ(θ)]dt+ σθε
′
φ,θ(θ)dBt
Collecting the terms
d(τ tR) = τ
t
Rλtd
(
u′(ct)
)
− σc,tσ
2
t εφ,θ(θt)dt+ τ
t
R
1
εφ,θ(θt)
dεφ,θ(θt)− τ
t
Rσc,tσ
2
t
θε′φ,θ
εφ,θ
dt
Thus, the result
d(τ tR) = −σc,tσ
2
t [εφ,θ(θt) + τ
t
R
θtε
′
φ,θ(θt)
εφ,θ(θt)
]dt+ τ tR[
1
u′(ct)
d
(
u′(ct)
)
+
1
εφ,θ(θt)
dεφ,θ(θt)].
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10 Implementation: Proof of Proposition 5
The savings tax Ts(at) is constructed to guarantee zero private wealth holdings as
in Werning (2011). The retirement benefits schedule b and labor income tax Ty
are such that, along the equilibrium path, the optimal allocations from the social
planner’s problem are affordable for each agent after all histories, given zero asset
holdings:
T (w∗t {θ
t−, θ}, {yt−, y∗t ({θ
t−, θ})}) = w∗t {θ
t−, θ}(y∗t ({θ
t−, θ})− c∗t ({θ
t−, θ}))
b(w∗t {θ
t−, θ}, {yt−, y∗t ({θ
t−, θ})}) = (1− w∗t {θ
t−, θ})c∗t ({θ
t−, θ}))
for all {wt−, yt−} such that {θt−} ∈ Θt({wt−, yt−}) 6= ∅, and all θ ∈ (0,+∞).
The retirement benefits and income taxes for off-equilibrium allocations —
those allocations which are not optimally assigned to any type in the social plan-
ner’s program — are set to be sufficiently unattractive, to ensure that agents do
not select them. Intuitively then, conditional on entering a period with no sav-
ings, and with a given history incomes, agents only face the choice of allocations
available in the planner’s problem after ability histories which, up to this period,
are consistent with the observed choices. By the temporal incentive compatibility
of the constrained efficient allocation, they will choose the allocation designed for
them. As a result, income taxes are only levied when the agent is working and
the agent receives retirement benefits after exiting the labor market.
To do so, I need to exclude histories {wt−, yt−} which do not correspond to
any history {θt−}. Consider a choice (wt, yt) which is not assigned in the social
planner’s problem for any type θt after history {θ
t−1} i.e, such that (wt, yt) /∈
Qt−w,y({θ
t−}). The income tax and retirement benefits at these levels have to be
sufficiently dissuasive to make them strictly dominated by allowed choices. There
are several ways to rule out these non-allowed allocations, and the goal here is just
to provide a possible one, which is to simply set the income taxes prohibitively
high if the agent must retire and the retirement benefits very low if the agent
must continue working, so that irrespective of savings, it is never optimal to chose
such allocations. Set implicit finite (but potentially very large) upper and lower
limits on asset holdings, a > 0 and a < 0. This can be done either by extending
the savings tax so that for at > a and at < a. For instance, after a history
{θt−} ∈ Θt({wt−, yt−}) and for any choice (wt, yt) /∈ Q
t−
w,y({θ
t−}), set
T (wt, {y
t}) > wt(a− a+ yt)
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b(wt, {y
t}) < −(1− wt)(a− a+ yt)
The retirement benefits and income tax at least confiscate income and impose
an additional penalty such that all wealth is confiscated and agents can never
borrow sufficiently to retain positive consumption. This leaves the agent with zero
consumption, and will never be chosen. The second and less draconian way is to
smooth the retirement benefits and income tax by making the agent slightly prefer
optimal allocation to non-allowed allocation. This is the approach I undertake in
the next implementation.
11 Pareto Optimal Retirement under Risk Neu-
trality
Consider the case of agents who are risk neutral in consumption and productiv-
ity is a GBM. Risk neutrality in consumption implies that consumption need not
be distorted. Because of the strict concavity of u(c) in the case of risk-averse
agents with a utilitarian planner, the equivalent generalized social marginal wel-
fare weights (as in Saez and Stantcheva (2016)) reflect decreasing marginal utility
of consumption. Lowly productivity agents have lower consumption and higher
marginal utility and therefore higher social welfare weights. To ensure compa-
rability between the risk-averse utilitarian and the risk neutral cases, I assume
that the planner puts Pareto welfare weights α(θ0) on each agent with initial type
θ0. Since with concave utility, marginal utility of consumption is non-increasing,
I assume the function α : Θ0 7→ (0; +∞) is non-increasing. I normalize the sum
of Pareto weights to one
∫∞
0
α(θ0)dF (θ0) = 1 and call the summand of weights
Λ(θ) =
∫ θ
0
α(θ0)dF (θ0).
The following lemma formulates the second-best retirement decision problem
by substituting optimal allocations in the planner’s problem.
Lemma 4. (Allocations and wedges) The labor wedges are time invariant and
depend only on initial heterogeneity and the welfare weights
τLt
1− τLt
=
τ(θ0)
1− τ(θ0)
= (1 +
1
ε
)
1
θ0
Λ(θ0)− F (θ0)
f(θ0)
(51)
In addition, the planner’s problem is to choose the retirement rule so as to solve:
max
TR
∫ ∞
0
E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt
[
(1−τ(θ0))
ε[yfbt −κ
(
yfbt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
]−[φt−
τ(θ0)
1− τ(θ0)
ε
1 + ε
θtφ
′
t(θt)]dt
}
dF (θ0)
(52)
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Proof. The problem of the planner is to choose allocations {c, y} and a retirement
rule TR to maximize social welfare subject to the definition of ex-ante utility, the
resource constraint (4), the relaxed incentive compatibility constraint (34) and
the law of motion of productivity (1). I rewrite the problem from the first-order
approach with risk neutrality below for reading convenience.
max
{c,y,v,TR}
∫ ∞
0
α(θ0)v(θ0)dF (θ0)
s.to
dθt
θt
= µdt+ σdBt
v(θ0)= E0
{∫ T
0
e−ρtctdt−
∫
TR
0
e−ρt[κ
(yt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
+ φt]dt
∣∣∣θ0}
0 ≤E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρtytdt
}
− E
{∫ T
0
e−ρtctdt
}
vθ(θ0)=
1
θ0
E0
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt[(1 +
1
ε
)κ
(yt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
− θtφ
′
t(θt)]dt
∣∣∣θ0} (FOA)
Eliminate consumption from the problem by plugging the definition of ex-ante
utility at time zero into the feasibility constraint (4). The feasibility constraint
then becomes:∫ ∞
0
(
v(θ0)+E0
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt
[
κ
(yt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
+φt
]
dt
∣∣∣θ0})dF (θ0) ≤
∫ ∞
0
E0
{∫ TR
0
e−ρtytdt
∣∣∣θ0}dF (θ0).
(53)
Denote by λ the multiplier on the new feasibility constraint (53). If v(θ0) is
interior, the first order conditions on v: α(θ0)f(θ0) − λf(θ0) = 0 integrated over
Θ0 yields λ = 1. The problem is then to maximize the Lagrangian∫ ∞
0
α(θ0)v(θ0)dF (θ0)−
[ ∫ ∞
0
(
v(θ0) + E0
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt[κ
(yt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
+ φt]dt
∣∣∣θ0})dF (θ0)
−
∫ ∞
0
E0
{∫ ν
0
e−ρtytdt
∣∣∣θ0}dF (θ0)]
subject to the incentive constraints from the FOA (34)and the law of motion of
productivity (1). By partial integration∫ ∞
0
v(θ0)dF (θ0) =
∫ ∞
0
1− F (θ0)
f(θ0)
vθ(θ0)dF (θ0) + lim
θ→0
v(θ)∫ ∞
0
α(θ0)v(θ0)dF (θ0) =
∫ ∞
0
1− Λ(θ0)
f(θ0)
vθ(θ0)dF (θ0) + lim
θ→0
v(θ).
Eliminating v from the Lagrangian using partial integration and the expression of
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vθ from in the incentive compatibility constraint, the planner’s problem becomes∫ ∞
0
E0
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt
[
yt−κ
(yt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
[
1+(1+
1
ε
)
Λ(θ0)− F (θ0)
f(θ0)
1
θ0
]
−[φt−
Λ(θ0)− F (θ0)
f(θ0)
θt
θ0
φ′t(θt)]
]
dt
∣∣∣θ0}}dF
(54)
The first order condition for yt implies that the labor wedge is time invariant and
depends only on initial heterogeneity and the welfare weights.
τLt
1− τLt
=
τ(θ0)
1− τ(θ0)
= (1 +
1
ε
)
1
θ0
Λ(θ0)− F (θ0)
f(θ0)
.
Since yfbt − κ
(
y
fb
t
θt
)1+
1
ε
1+ 1
ε
=
θ1+εt
κε(1+ε)
and ysbt − κ
(
ysbt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1+ 1
ε
[
1 + (1 + 1
ε
)Λ(θ0)−F (θ0)
f(θ0)
1
θ0
]
=
(1− τ(θ0))
ε θ
1+ε
t
κε(1+ε)
then I can replace ysb in the planner’s objective (54) to obtain
max
ν
∫ ∞
θ
E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt
[
(1−τ(θ0))
ε[yfbt −κ
(
yfbt
θt
)1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
]−[φt−
τ(θ0)
1− τ(θ0)
ε
1 + ε
θtφ
′
t(θt)]dt
}
dF (θ0).
(55)
The normalization of Pareto weights and the assumption of non-increasing
weights implies that Λ(θ0)− F (θ0) is always non-negative. The labor wedges are
therefore non-negative. In the risk neutral case, with GBM productivity, the labor
wedges only depend on the inverse intensive Frisch elasticity of labor supply, initial
heterogeneity, and the welfare weights of the planner. Because there is no income
effect, consumption can be allocated freely over time without distorting the labor
margin.
In the context of private information, labor distortions are such that the flow
utility of consumption and disutility of labor is lower than it is in the first-best.
This is captured by the factor (1 − τ(θ0))
ε < 1 in front of [yfbt − κ
(yfbt /θt)
1+1/ε
1+1/ε
] in
the planner’s objective. These labor distortions create incentives for the agents to
retire early. However, the virtual fixed cost either increases or decreases depending
on the sign of φ
′
t(θt).
If φ
′
t is negative, the virtual fixed cost increases compared to the first-best.
Its effect goes in the same direction as the decrease in output y and agents re-
tire earlier than in the first-best. Therefore, if φ
′
t is negative, all agents retire
earlier in the second-best compared to the first-best. In addition, retirement is
a cut-off rule. If φ
′
t is positive, the virtual fixed cost decreases compared to the
first-best and depends negatively on the intensive Frisch elasticity of labor and the
labor wedge. Its effect goes in the opposite direction as the decrease in y. Hav-
ing solved the retirement decision problem in the first-best case, the derivation
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of the analogous rule for the second-best scenario is relatively simple. Dividing
the planner’s objective by (1 − τ(θ0))
ε, one can observe that the choice of the
retirement rule in the second-best is equivalent to the choice of the retirement
rule in the first-best when the fixed utility cost is replaced by a virtual cost φ˜
defined as φ˜(t, θt) =
φ(t, θt)
(1− τ(θ0))ε
(1−
τ(θ0)
1− τ(θ0)
ε
1 + ε
εφ,θ(θt, t)). In contrast to
the first-best case, the retirement rule depends on initial productivity. Defining
S(τ(θ0), t) ≡ φ˜(t, θt)/φ(t, θt), and S(τ(θ0)) ≡ φ˜(θt)/φ(θt) when φ is time-invariant.
The following proposition summarizes the results on second-best retirement deci-
sion.
Proposition 10. (Second-best retirement decision)
1. There exists a time-dependent and initial productivity dependent determin-
istic retirement threshold θsbR (t, θ0) such that T
sb
R = inf{t; θt ≤ θ
sb
R (t, θ0)}.
2. Set φ(θ) = φ1θ
1+1/εφ + φ0. A the infinite horizon limit, T = +∞ the re-
tirement thresholds are time-invariant θˆsbR : Θ0 7→ R
+∗, T sbR = inf{t; θt ≤
θsbR (θ0)} and
θsbR (θ0) = θ
fb
R S(τ(θ0))
1
ε .
3. If φ1 ≤ 0, retirement occurs earlier in the second-best compared to the first-
best for all agents θsbR (t, θ0) ≥ θ
fb
R (t). If φ1 > 0 , a criterion for whether
retirement happens early or is delayed compared to the first-best is
S(θ0) =
1
(1− τ(θ0))ε
(1−
τ(θ0)
1− τ(θ0)
1 + 1/εφ
1 + 1/ε
)
For a given T < +∞, retirement occurs earlier in the second-best compared
to the first-best: θsbR (t, θ0) ≥ θ
fb
R (t) for all t ≤ T if and only if S(θ0) ≥ 1.
Point 1 of the proposition highlights that retirement thresholds depend on the
initial productivity of the agents. Again, the option of continued work compared
to retiring is negative at retirement. The second point gives an explicit formula
for the optimal retirement threshold at infinite horizon as in the discussion after
Corollary 1.39 Point 2 gives an explicit expression for the retirement thresholds at
infinite horizon.
Point 3 of the proposition states that if the fixed utility cost is increasing in
productivity, there is a force that pushes for delayed retirement. High types have
39There is no concern for immiseration at infinite horizon here since, with risk neutrality in
consumption, consumption is not pinned down by first order conditions.
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a high fixed cost and lower information rents than in the case when the fixed cost
is independent of productivity. This creates an effect that goes in the opposite
direction of the income tax. Depending on the strength of this effect retirement
may occur early or be delayed compared to the first-best. The proposition shows
that the relative weight of the two forces depends on the criterion S that in turn
depends on the intensive Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the elasticity of the
fixed cost with respect to the wage and the welfare weights of the planner. This
criterion allows one to determine what productivity types should be induced to
retire before S(θ0) ≥ 1 or after the first-best S(θ0) < 1. Not that this is a relative
comparison of the retirement decision in the second-best relative to first-best, but
not a discussion of the retirement wedge and its implementation in the quasilinear
case, which I turn to next.
12 Implementation: Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5. For any smooth distribution f such that θ0f(θ0) →θ0→∞ 0 (which is
satisfied by all densities that have a mean), for all τ , there exist Pareto weights
that are smooth on the support of f , except that put weight on the min of the
support of f , such that the optimal tax is constant, τ(θ0) = τ .
Λ(θ) =
∫ θ
0
α(θ0)dF (θ0). We want in the interior Λ(θ)−F (θ) =
τ
1−τ
θf(θ). The
limit condition in the lemma comes from the fact that Λ(∞) − F (∞) = 0. Now
the derivative is a necessary condition in the interior
[α(θ)− 1] =
τ
1− τ
[1 + θ]
So
α(θ) = 1 +
τ
1− τ
[1 +
θf ′(θ)
f(θ)
]
with a mass at the bottom support θ such that the sum of weights add up to 1,
i.e
αθ = 1−
∫ θ
θ
α(θ0)dF (θ0) = −
τ
1− τ
(1 +
∫ ∞
θ
θf ′(θ))dθ =
τ
1− τ
θf(θ)
And of course the condition that the weights are positive everywhere i.e
θf ′(θ)
f(θ)
≥ −
1
τ
In particular, if the support of the distribution starts at zero, there is no mass
at zero.
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In particular if the distribution is Pareto (θ, α) such that f(θ) = aθ
a
θa+1
then
θf ′(θ)
f(θ)
= −1− a and the weights are constant
α(θ) = 1−
τ
1− τ
a
and
αθ =
τ
1− τ
a
One can also invert this to show that with Pareto distribution and such type
of Pareto weights that I call Rawlsian-Utilitarian the tax is given by:
τ =
1
a
αθ
1 + αθ
which is a zero marginal tax τ = 0 if αθ = 0 and utilitarian. And τ =
1
2a
if
Rawlsian.
13 Implementation: Proof of Proposition 6
I started with the definition of a reflected process above the second-best retirement
boundary.
Definition 3. (Reflected Process) Let θ∗R : [0, T ] → R be a càdlàg function. A
processes {θ˜t}t on (Ω,F ,P) is called a reflected version of {θt}t with barrier θ
∗
R if
it satisfies the following conditions:
1. θ˜t is constrained to stay above θ
∗
R: For every t ∈ [0, T ] we have θ˜t ≥ θ
∗
R(t)
a.s.
2. Until {θt} hits the barrier both processes coincide: For every 0 ≤ t < T
∗
R
we have θt = θ˜t a.s.
3. θ˜ is always higher than θ: For every t ∈ [0, T ] we have θ˜t ≥ θt a.s.
4. When {θt} hits the barrier, {θ˜t}t is at θ
∗
R: θ˜T ∗R = θ
∗
R(T
∗
R ) a.s.
The next proposition ensures the existence of a reflected version of the pro-
ductivity process at the second-best retirement boundary for our GBM diffusion
process.
Proposition 11. Let θ∗R : [0, T ]→ R be a càdlàg function. If {θt}t has no jumps,
then there exists a version of {θt}t reflected at θ
∗
R.
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The conditions of this proposition are just the necessary ones to obtain our
result. In general, there exist reflected versions at càdlàg boundaries for a very
large class of processes including those with downward jumps.
Now I proceed to prove Proposition6 . If the government sets a flat labor
income tax equal to τ from Lemma 5, and a post-retirement transfer π is a function
of retirement age, then the agent chooses hours conditional on work optimally
yt = y
∗
t and his private retirement decision satisfies:
max
ν
E
{∫ ν
0
e−ρt
[
(1− τ)y∗t − h(
y∗t
θt
)− φ(θt)
]
dt+ e−ρνπ(ν)
}
.
The occurrence of π is here to implement the wedges τφ with post-retirement
transfers. From Proposition 10 we know that the second-best retirement decision
is a cut-off rule, θ∗R. Then Theorem 5 of Strack and Kruse (2013) applies and
implies that
π(t) = Et
{∫ T
t
e−ρs
[
[(1− τ)y˜∗s − h(
y˜∗s
θ˜s
)− φ(θ˜s)
]
ds
}
implements the second-best retirement decision, where y˜∗t = (1− τ)
ε θ˜
1+ε
t
κε(1+ε)
.
14 Implementation: Proof of Proposition 7
As in the previous implementation, I start by setting the savings tax such that the
agents are not willing to privately save. Because of risk neutrality in consump-
tion, the savings tax can be set to zero. Given a history-independent income tax
T (yt), and a history-dependent lifetime retirement benefit b({yt},TR) the agent’s
consumption before retirement is ct = yt−T (yt) and after retirement, the NPV of
consumption is cTRg(TR) = b({yt},TR). The agents private optimization problem
is:
max
yt,ν
∫ ∞
θ
E
{∫ ν
0
e−ρt[yt− T (yt)− h(
yt
θt
)]−φt(θ)
]
dt+ e−ρνb({ys}, ν)
}
dF (θ0) (56)
I search for affordable benefits of the form
b({yt}, ν) = −T (0)g(ν) + π(ν) + f({yt},T
∗
R )
that guarantees that yt = y
∗
t after which we will know that ν = T
∗
R by construction
of the transfer π. The necessary condition for optimal hours is, given T ∗R
(1− T ′(yt) + e
−ρ(T ∗R−t)
∂b({ys},T
∗
R )
yt
= h(
y∗t
θt
) = 1− τ
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Setting
e−ρ(T
∗
R−t)
∂b({ys},T
∗
R )
yt
= T ′(y)− τ
And integrating pathwise over y,
e−ρT
∗
Rf({ys},T
∗
R ) =
∫
T ∗R
0
e−ρt[T (yt)− τyt]dt
guarantees that yt = y
∗
t . The transfer π(TR) guarantees that ν = T
∗
R as long
as it is affordable by the aggregate resource constraint. Now observe that if π
implements the second-best retirement decision, any lump-sum transfer added to
π also implements the second-best retirement decision. This will allow me to adjust
the lump-sum transfer −T (0) until the aggregate resource constraint is satisfied
in equilibrium.
T (0)g(0) + E
{∫ T ∗R
0
e−ρtT (y∗t )
}
= E[e−ρT
∗
Rπ(T ∗R )] + E[e
−ρT ∗Rf({y∗s},T
∗
R )]
Replacing the expression of −T (0) in b yields that for any TR:
b({yt}, ν) =
g(ν)
g(0)
(
E
{∫ T ∗R
0
e−ρtT (y∗t )
}
− E[e−ρT
∗
Rf({y∗s},T
∗
R )]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
level around second best corrected for tax distortion
+ π(ν)−
g(ν)E[e−ρT
∗
Rπ(T ∗R )]
g(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
actuarial adjustment
+ f({ys},T
∗
R )︸ ︷︷ ︸
function of past earnings
which simplifies from the expression of f to:
b({yt}, ν) =
g(ν)
g(0)
(
E
{∫ T ∗R
0
e−ρtτy∗t )
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
level around second best corrected for tax distortion
+ π(ν)−
g(ν)E[e−ρT
∗
Rπ(T ∗R )]
g(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
actuarial adjustment
+ f({ys},T
∗
R )︸ ︷︷ ︸
function of past earnings
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Rename without lost of generality the income tax T to a tax on labor income with-
out the lump-sum transfer. The benefits b({yt}, ν), combined with labor income
tax and the lump-sum transfer, implements the planner’s optimum.
15 Extensions of the Canonical Model
In this section, I present the extensions of the results to the case of non-separable
utility in consumption and labor, agents with stochastic lifetimes and productivity-
dependent fixed costs.
15.1 Non-Separable Utility and Leisure-Consumption Com-
plementarity
In this section, I relax the assumption of separable intensive preferences in con-
sumption and labor. In particular, I allow for non-separabilities between con-
sumption and leisure. Saez (2002) argues that this non-separability is important
to study optimal income taxation. Non-separability between consumption and
leisure brings difficulties in that the Inverse Euler equation does not hold. It is
well known that with nonseparable preferences, the no capital tax result of Atkin-
son and Stiglitz (1976) does not hold. The reason is that income and productivity
now directly affect the intertemporal rate of substitution for consumption. In-
tertemporal distortions allow to separate types and relax incentive constraints.
Denote the consumption function C(y, u, θ) the inverse of u(·, y
θ
). Define
η(y, u, θ) ≡
−θCyθ(y, u, θ)
Cy(y, u, θ)
.
By differentiation of the implicit function C, Cy = −uy/uc = |MRSt| = 1−τ
L
t
is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Therefore
η represents the elasticity −d log |MRSt|
d log θt
and plays an important role in this section.
In the separable isoelastic utility case above, this elasticity is η(y, u, θ) = 1 + 1
ε
.
Define the co-state λt = Kv as in the separable utility case. With non-separable
utility, λ is still a martingale dλt = σλ,tσtdBt but is not the inverse of the marginal
utility of consumption since the Inverse Euler equation does not hold. The labor
wedge satisfies
d
( 1
uc
1
η
τLt
1− τLt
)
= [λtσλ,tσ
2
t ]dt. (57)
The no-volatility result generalizes: the stochastic process 1
uc
1
η
τLt
1−τLt
has zero in-
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stantaneous volatility so that its realized paths vary much less than those for
productivity, in the sense that they are of bounded variation. To qualify the
wedges further, I consider the Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences
u(c, l) =
1
1− ν
(
c−
l1+
1
ε
1 + 1
ε
)1−ν
(58)
for ν > 0. Then η = 1 + 1
ε
and the labor wedge satisfies
d
( τLt
1− τLt
1
uc
)
= [(1 +
1
ε
)λtσλ,t]σ
2
t dt.
as well as
d
( τLt
1− τLt
)
= [(1 +
1
ε
)(λtuc)σλ,t]σ
2
t dt+
τLt
1− τLt
1
uc
d(uc). (59)
The dynamics of the labor wedge depend on the covariance between growth in λ
and log-productivity, the inverse intensive Frisch elasticity of labor supply, λtuc
(which is one in the separable utility case) and the innovations in marginal of
consumption. The first term of labor wedge is the drift term similar to the one
in formula 44. The term that mirrors the marginal utility of consumption is
responsible for the short-run regressivity. The net retirement wedge satisfies the
same equilibrium relation involving the labor wedge, namely,
τRt = −
τLt
1− τLt
ε
1 + ε
εφ,θ(θt). (60)
From 59 and 60 one deducts similar dynamics for the net retirement wedge:
d(τ tR) = −σλ,tσ
2
t [εφ,θ(θt) + τ
t
R
θtε
′
φ,θ(θt)
εφ,θ(θt)
]dt+ τ tR[
1
u′(ct)
d
(
u′(ct)
)
+
1
εφ,θ(θt)
dεφ,θ(θt)].
The following lemma characterizes the first-best retirement decision in this
setting.
Lemma 6. Suppose u is a Greenwood et al. (1988)-type utility function. The
optimal retirement rule in the first-best is a cut-off rule T fbR = inf{t; θt ≤ θ
fb
R (t)}.
Proof. Denote λ the Lagrangian on the government’s resource constraint. The
first order condition on ct when an agent works is
(
ct −
l
1+1ε
t
1+ 1
ε
)−ν
= λ and c−νt = λ
when an agent is retired. The first order condition for the labor supply of workers
is l
1
ε
t λ = λθt so that lt = θ
ε
t . After rearranging and simplifying, the terms inλ
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cancel out and the planner’s retirement problem is rewritten as:
max
{λ,TR}
E
{∫ TR
0
e−ρt[λ
(θt)
1+ε
(1 + ε)
− φt(θt)]dt
}
.
The proof ends as in the proof of Propositon 1 applying Theorem 4.3 in Jacka and
Lynn (1992).
The conjecture could be made from this lemma that in the second-best as well,
agents with a history of low productivity shocks retire earlier than agents with a
history of high productivity.
As for retirement consumption, it is constant after retirement as in the separa-
ble utility case. However, because the Inverse Euler does not hold, little is known
about consumption before retirement and about whether such consumption drops
at retirement in the second-best. In the first-best though, the smooth pasting
condition implies that marginal utility of consumption is continuous at retirement
and consumption drops at retirement c
T
+
R
= c
T
−
R
+
θfbR (t)
1+ε
1+1/ε
to counter the discrete
fall in labor.
15.2 Uncertain Lifetime Correlated with Income
There is empirical evidence that life expectancy is positively correlated with in-
come. Chetty et al. (2016) find that in the United States, between 2001-2014,
the gap in life expectancy between the richest 1% and poorest 1% of individuals
is 14.6 years.
To model this positive correlation, I assume that there exist an exogenous
productivity threshold θD such that T = TD = inf{t ∈ R, θt ≤ θD}. Then
the discounting function after retirement with productivity θ ≥ θD is g(θ) =
1
ρ
(
1−
(
θ
θD
)γ−)
(increasing in current productivity θ) in which γ− is the negative
solution of ρ = µγ + σ
2
2
γ(γ − 1). This modeling choice has the convenience that,
if productivity is a GBM, time is not a state variable of the planner’s problem
anymore while each agent have a finite expected lifetime. Since the problem is
time homogenous, I focus on retirement consumption rather than the life cycle
pattern of the wedges. The HJB equation becomes
0 = max
ct,yt,TR,σ∆,t
{
−K + g(θ)u−1l=0(
v
g(θ)
) , −ρK + (ct − yt) + L(v,∆, θ) ◦K
}
where the derivatives operator over state variables L is defined in Appendix A.
For a given promised utility v, retirement consumption u−1l=0(
v
g(θ)
) is decreasing
in current productivity. In addition, the net present value of retirement benefits
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are g(θ)u−1l=0(
v
g(θ)
) and for a given promised utility v they are lower for highly
productive agents compared to lowly productive agents.40 Other things equal,
with stochastic lifetime correlated with income, the planner can take advantage
of the fact that highly productive agents have longer life expectancy than the
general population in order to give them lower retirement consumption and lower
net present value of consumption compared to a model in which the end of the
horizon is the average life expectancy T = E[TD].
15.3 Fast-Increasing Fixed Costs
Technical assumption 1assumes that the fixed utility cost of staying in the labor
market does not grow too fast in productivity i.e there exists ψ > 0, such that
∀(θ, t), φ
′
t(θ) ≤ ψθ
ε. This section relaxes this assumption and shows that if the
fixed utility cost of staying in the labor market grows fast in productivity, when
agents promised utility becomes high, they become too costly to incentivize to
work and they retire.
Lemma 7. Suppose there exists ψ > 0 such that φt(θt) ≥ ψθ
1+ε
t . Then, for each
t there exists a promised utility v∗t such that if vt ≥ v
∗
t , the planner collects more
revenue from retiring the agent than from making him work.
Proof. For a fixed θ, the function y 7→
h( y
θ
)+φt(θt)
y
is minimized at a y that satisfies
1
θ
h′(y
θ
) =
h( y
θ
)+φt(θt)
y
(marginal utility cost equals average utility cost). This yields
ymin
θ
=
(
φt(θ)(1+ε)
κ
) ε
1+ε
and the minimum value of average cost is 1
θ
h′(ymin
θ
) =
κ
ε
1+ε
((1+ε)φt(θt))
1
1+ε
θt
. With the assumption on φt I have uniformly on θ and t,
h(yt
θt
) + φt(θt) ≥ Kyt in which K = κ
ε
1+ε ((1 + ε)ψ)
1
1+ε .
For any vt and t define c¯ the constant consumption level which, given contin-
ually to the agent after t, gives him an expected utility of vt: g(t)u(c¯(t, vt)) = vt.
Also define v∗t by u
′(c¯(t, v∗t )) = K. Such a level exists provided that u
′(0) > K, a
condition without which the agent would never work even in the full information
solution (and which is true by definition for log utility). Then for vt ≥ v
∗
t the
agent does not work and the optimal contract is ct′ = c¯(t, vt) for all t
′ ≥ t. To see
this, let vt ≥ v
∗
t , then u
′(c¯(t, vt)) ≤ K. From concavity of u and inequality on h,
vt = E
(∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(u(cs)− 1s≤TR [h(
ys
θs
)+φs(θs)])ds
)
≤ E
(∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(u(c¯(t, vt))
+(cs − c¯(t, vt))u
′(c¯(t, vt))− 1s≤TRKys)ds
)
40For a concave utility function u, the function g 7→ gu−1(v/g) is decreasing.
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≤ g(t)u(c¯(t, vt))− u
′(c¯(t, vt))E
(∫ T
t
e−r(s−t)(1s≤TRys − cs)ds+ g(t)c¯(t, vt)
)
.
Since vt = g(t)u(c¯(t, vt)) and u
′ ≥ 0 , the revenue from any allocation (c, y) is
less than −g(t)c¯(t, vt) which is the revenue from retiring the agent with constant
consumption c¯(t, vt). It follows that for vt ≥ v
∗
t the agent does not work.
The argument of the proof is mechanical and comes directly from the fast
growth in φt(θt). The lemma applies to any allocations, even non-incentive-
compatible ones.
Note that the lemma does not imply directly that under the conditions speci-
fied there is an upper retirement boundary since promised utility is an endogenous
state variable of the problem. The existence of such a boundary depends on how
big the government exogenous revenue −G is to achieve high promised utility.
Indeed, if ψ is high it becomes more and more costly to incentivize high types
who need to be retired whenever they have accumulated a high promised utility.41
Under these conditions, both agents with a history of low productivity shocks and
agents with a history of high productivity shocks retire earlier than agents with a
history of average productivity.
41For instance, following the notation in the proof in Appendix A, for log utility the highest
promised fixed consumption before retirement occurs is c¯(t, v∗t ) = 1/K. This quantity decreases
with ψ; therefore when ψ is high the likelihood of an upper retirement boundary being endoge-
nously hit is higher.
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Appendix For Online Publication
Part II
B - Computational Appendix
1 Dynamic Mirrlees Model Numerical Algorithm
1.1 Planning Problem
I do a numerical simulation of a discrete time version of the model. I present
the discrete time model and the algorithm of the numerical simulation below.
An agent working until time t, reports a productivity history θt and the planner
recommends {c(θt), y(θt), v(θt),∆(θt), s(θt)}. A retirement decision s equal to zero
means the agent works work in period t + 1 and equal to one means the agents
retires forever independently of θt+1.
Define u(c, y; θ) = u(c, y
θ
) and f t(θt|θt−1) the conditional density of θt. With
the savings rate denoted q−1, the planner’s problem is to minimize the cost K
such that, for a working agent s = 0:
K(v,∆, θ−, t, 0) = min
[ ∫
{c(θ)− y(θ) + qK(v(θ),∆(θ), θ, t+1, τ(θ))f t(θt|θ−)dθ
]
subject to for all θ ∈ Θ
w(θ) = u(c(θ), y(θ); θ)− φt(θ) + βv(θ)
w˙(θ) = uθ(c(θ), y(θ); θ)− φθ(θ) + β∆(θ)
And
v =
∫
w(θ)f t(θ|θ−)dθ
∆ =
∫
w(θt)∂θ−f
t(θ|θ−)dθ.
1
Define
βtfact =
1− βT+1−t
1− β
.
For a retired agent s = 1 and ∆ = 0:
K(v, 0, θ, t+ 1, 1) = βt+1factu
−1
( v
βt+1fact
)
.
The relaxed planning problem can be recovered by setting t = 1 and treating
∆ a as control variable:
K(v) = min
∆
K(v,∆, θ0, 1, 0).
1.2 Normalization
The process for productivity is a geometric random walk: θt = θt−1εt in which εt
is log-normal log εt ∼ N(−
σ2
2
, σ2). Preferences are separable in consumption and
labor and u(ct) = log(ct) and I denote h(yt/θt) the disutility of labor. The fixed
cost of staying in the labor market is a funtion of age φ(t). To reduce the number
of state variables I re-normalize y˜t ≡ yt/θt−1, c˜t ≡ ct/θt−1, h(yt/θt) = h(y˜t/εt).
Denote g the density of εt. The densities of θt and εt are linked by f(θt|θt−1)dθt =
g(εt)dεt and ∂θt−1f(θt|θt−1)dθt =
1
θt−1
(g(εt)+εtg
′(εt))dεt (See derivation in Stantcheva
(2017)). Denote g˜(εt) = g(εt) + εtg
′(εt). Let φt(θ) = φ ln(θ) + φ1(t).
Normalized continuation variables are defined as:
v˜t ≡E
( TR(θt)∑
s=t+1
βs−t−1(log(cs/θt)− h(ys/θs)− φt(θs/θt)) +
T∑
s=τ(θt)+1
βs−t−1 log(cs/θt)
)
=vt − β
fact
t+1 log(θt) + φEβ
fact(TR(θ
t))
t+1 log(θt)
And
w˜t(θ
t) ≡u(c˜t)− h(y˜t/εt)− φ(θt/θt−1) + β
( TR(θt)∑
s=t+1
βs−t−1(log(cs/θt−1)− h((ys/θt−1)/(θs/θt−1))− φt(θs
+
T∑
s=τ(θt)+1
βs−t−1 log(cs/θt−1)
)
=u(c˜t)− h(y˜t/εt)− φt(εt) + βv˜t + β
fact
t (µ(t) + log(εt))− φEβ
fact(TR(θ
t))
t (µ(t) + log(εt))
=wt − β
fact
t log(θt−1) + φβ
fact(TR(θ
t))
t log(θt−1),
2
∆˜t−1 ≡ ∆t−1/θt−1.
Renormalized constraints The promise-keeping constraint
vt−1 =
∫
wt(θt)f
t(θt|θt−1)dθt
implies
v˜t−1+β
fact
t log(θt−1)−φβ
fact(TR(θ
t))
t log(θt−1) =
∫
[w˜t(θt)+β
fact
t log(θt−1)−φβ
fact(TR(θ
t))
t log(θt−1)]f
t(θt|
Therefore
v˜t−1 =
∫
w˜t(εt)gǫ(εt)dεt.
Sensitivity of promised utility
∆t−1 =
∫
wt(θt)∂θt−1f
t(θt|θt−1)dθt
becomes
∆t−1 =
∫
[w˜t(εt) + β
fact
t log(θt−1)]g
t(θt|θt−1)dθt.
The integral in log is zero because it’s the derivative of the expectation of a
constant. Therefore
∆t−1 =
∫
w˜t(εt)
g˜(εt)
θt−1
dεt
and
∆˜t−1 =
∫
w˜t(εt)g˜(εt)dεt.
In addition
∂w˜(εt)
∂εt
= −
y˜t
ε2t
h′(
y˜t
εt
)− φ′t(εt) + β
∆˜t
εt
.
1.3 Normalized Planning Problem
Let K˜ = K/θt−1. The planner’s problem is then
K˜(v˜, ∆˜, t, 0) = min
[ ∫
{c˜(ε)− y˜(ε) + qεK˜(v˜(ε), ∆˜(ε), t+ 1, s˜(ε))g(εt)dεt
]
3
Subject to
w˜t(εt) = u(c˜t)−h(y˜t/εt)−φt(εt)+βv˜t+β
fact
t (µ(t)+log(εt))−φEβ
fact(TR)
t (µ(t)+log(εt))
∂w˜(εt)
∂εt
=
y˜t
ε2t
h′(
y˜t
εt
)− φ′t(εt) + β
∆˜t
εt
v˜t−1 =
∫
w˜t(εt)g(εt)dεt
∆˜t−1 =
∫
w˜t(εt)g˜(εt)dεt
and for retired agents:
K˜(v˜, 0, t, 1) = min
[ ∫
{c˜(ε) + qεK˜(v˜(ε), 0, t+ 1, 1)g(εt)dεt
]
Subject to
w˜t(εt) = u(c˜t) + βv˜t + β
fact
t (µ(t) + log(εt))
v˜t−1 =
∫
w˜t(εt)g(εt)dεt.
1.4 Hamiltonian and First Order Conditions
Dropping the tildes, the Hamiltonian of the normalized problem is, while working:
[Ct(y(ε), w(ε)− βv(ε), ε)− y(ε)]g(ε)
+q[K(v(ε),∆(ε), ε, t+ 1, s(ε))]g(ε)
+λ[v − w(ε)g(ε)] + γ[∆− w(ε)g˜(ε)]
+p(ε)[utθ(C
t(y(ε), w(ε)− βv(ε), ε), y(ε), ε) + β∆(ε)]
And the limits of the co-state p(ε) are zero at zero and infinity. The co-state
satisfies:
dp(ε)
dε
= −
[ 1
u′(c(ε))
− λ− γ
g˜(εt)
g(εt)
]
g(εt) (61)
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The FOCs for ∆(ε), v(ε) and y(ε) are:
p(ε)
ε2g(εt)
= −
q
β
γ(ε)
1
u′(c(ε))
=
q
β
ελ(ε) (62)
1−
1
ε
h′( y˜(ε)
ε
)
u′(c(ε))
=
p(ε)
ε2g(εt)
h′(
y˜(ε)
ε
)[1 +
y˜(ε)
ε
h′′( y˜(ε)
ε
)
h′( y˜(ε)
ε
)
]. (63)
In these equations, I denote the extensions of λ and γ to retired states with
the same notation.
1.5 Algorithm
Since the model is in finite horizon, the algorithm solves policy functions backwards
from t = T , vT (ε) = 0,∆T (ε) = 0, sT (ε) = 1.
The algorithm takes as state space the dual (λ−γ−, ε, s−). I truncate ε between
the first percentile and the 99% percentile. The algorithm goes in the following
steps:
• If in working state at time t: s− = 0
1. Start with a guess for the promised utility of the lowest type in a given
period: wt(εlow)
(a) Solve for yt(λt, st, εt, pt, wt(εlow)) using (63) and (62).
(b) Solve for λt(st, εt, pt, wt(εlow)) from (62), replacing c as a function
of w and v using the solution for yt(λt, st, εt, pt, wt(εlow)) computed
in 1(a).
(c) Solve for γt(st, εt, pt, wt(εlow)).
(d) Replace 1/u′(c) using (62) in the ODE (61) satisfied by the co-state
p and solve the ODE.
i. While solving the ODE compareKt+1(λt(st = 0), γt(st = 0), ε, 0)
to Kt+1(λt(st = 1), γt(st = 1), ε, 1) and set st equal to the work
status with lowest cost.
2. Check the boundary condition p(εhigh).
(a) If the boundary condition is not met within the tolerance level
change wt(εlow) and go to 1.
3. Once the boundary condition is met, follow 1. in reverse order to com-
pute policy functions.
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(a) Compute w˜t, v˜−, ∆˜− using their integral definitions.
• If in retired state at time t: s− = 0
– Set λt = λ−/ε, γt = 0, st = 1, c˜t = λ−, y˜t = 0.
2 Optimal Policies
2.1 Degree of Social Insurance and Tax Progressivity
In Figure 11. Panel A, I present a measure of the degree of insurance of the social
insurance system as a whole by plotting the net present value of consumption
against the net present value of output. Without insurance, such quantities would
vary one for one. The presence of overall insurance in the decentralized constrained
optimum makes the net present value of consumption vary less than one for one
with the present value of income. This result is also true in a model with exogenous
retirement. A novel point of our analysis is that this overall degree of insurance is
larger when incentivizing for delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and
insurance role (φ = 0.4).
Furthermore, Panel B of the same figure shows that the social insurance system
is overall progressive in that the ratio of the net present value of consumption to
the net present value of earnings increases as lifetime earnings increase. I find that
the population average of the elasticity of the NPV of lifetime consumption with
respect to the NPV of lifetime income is 0.67 for φ = 0.4 and 0.82 for φ = −0.7.
As a result, the social insurance system is overall more progressive and provides
more insurance when incentivizing delayed retirement has a positive redistributive
and insurance role.
Figure 12 Panel A shows that lifetime taxation is progressive in that the ratio
of the net present value of income after earning taxes and retirement contributions
to the net present value of earnings decreases as lifetime earnings increase. Equiv-
alently, the ratio of the net present value of labor income taxes and retirement
contributions to the net present value of earnings increases as lifetime earnings
increase (Panel B.) I find that the average of elasticity of the NPV of after-tax
income with respect to the NPV of lifetime income is 0.66 for φ = 0.4 and 0.79
for φ = −0.7. As a result, the earnings tax and retirement contribution system in
isolation is more progressive when incentivizing delayed retirement has a positive
redistributive and insurance role. This is consistent with the fact that when incen-
tivizing delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role, there
6
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Figure 11: Panel A shows the relative degree of social insurance between the
simulation for φ = 0.4 and φ = −0.7. Panel B highlights the relative progressivity
of social insurance system between the two simulations. The social insurance
system is overall more progressive and provides more insurance when incentivizing
delayed retirement has a positive redistributive and insurance role (φ = 0.4).
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is less of a role for the labor income tax to decrease at high incomes to incentivize
work.
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Figure 12: Progressivity of tax system. The earnings tax and retirement contribu-
tion system in isolation is more progressive when incentivizing delayed retirement
has a positive redistributive and insurance role (φ = 0.4).
2.2 Moments and Properties of Optimal Allocations
Figure 13 plots the cross-sectional average allocations over time. Average output
follows the hump-shaped profile of productivity before declining with retirement.
8
Mean consumption is constant, as a result of the Inverse Euler equation (9) and
log utility with ρ = r, which imply that consumption is a martingale.
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Figure 13: Mean allocations
Figure 14 plots average allocations of workers over time. Average output
among workers follows the hump-shaped profile of productivity until old-age.
When mostly lowly productive workers start retiring, average output among work-
ers goes up, reflecting a pool of remaining workers more productive than the gen-
eral population. Mean consumption is constant, in young age due consumption
being a martingale. When agents start retiring, the remaining pool of highly
productive workers has higher average consumption.
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Figure 14: Mean allocations of workers
Figure 15 plots the average consumption of retires over time. Early retirees
have low consumption and more productive workers retire over time. Average
9
consumption of retires increases until it equalizes the average consumption over
the general population.
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Figure 15: Mean allocations of retirees
Figure 16 shows the optimal and baseline labor force participation rate as
a function of age. Figure 17The labor force participation rate decreases until
age 75, after which it is non-zero at each age but less than 1%. The Average
Retirement Age (ARA) is larger in the optimum than in the baseline economy,
and the optimum does not feature the spikes in retirement hazard at ages 62 and
66. This is consistent with the fact there are still considerable implicit disincentives
to continued work between the Early Eligibility Age and age 70 in the U.S. tax
and SS system as documented by Gruber and Wise (1998).
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Figure 16: Labor force participation
Figure 18 plots the cross-sectional variances of output, and consumption, over
time. The variance of output is driven by the variance of productivity and the
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Figure 17: Retirement Hazard Ratio
variance of work hours. The variance of productivity is slightly hump-shaped,
while the variance of work hours is strongly hump-shaped and declines close to
retirement. Output is much more volatile than consumption. Hence, pre-tax
income inequality grows at an increasing rate, but the provision of insurance pre-
vents this from translating fully into consumption inequality. In addition, while
consumption variance grows, it does so at a decreasing rate, echoing the tax and
retirement wedge smoothing results described above. At retirement, the variance
of consumption stays constant.
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Figure 18: Variance of allocations
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3 Baseline Economy Numerical Algorithm
I present the income fluctuation model in the baseline U.S. economy. In this
economy, agents who face idiosyncratic productivity shocks, consume and save
in a risk-free asset, choose their working hours and the age at which they retire.
I define retirement as an irreversible exit of the labor force. I assume that the
retirement age and the SS benefits claiming age are the same. Denote s the last
working period of an agent, i.e s = t if the agent works at time t and s < t if
the agent retired before t. The productivity θt represents current productivity if
s = t and last working productivity if s < t, θt = θs. With log utility, agents never
hit their borrowing constraints because they consume at each period a constant
fraction of their net worth. Denote T (yt) the Heathcote et al. (2014) income tax
function and b({yt′}t′∈[0,s], s) the SS benefits as a function of the history of earning
and the retirement age. I make a Tauchen approximation of the productivity
process θt = θ
ρ
t−1εt where ρ = 0.999 and denote the transition matrix π.
For a given asset level at and productivity θt, Average Indexed Monthly Earn-
ings AIMEt a working agent’s continuation utility is
vt (at, θt , AIMEt, t) = max
ct,yt,at+1,st+1
ln (ct)− h(
yt
θt
)− φt(θt) + βE[vt+1 (at+1, θt+1, AIMEt+1, st+1) |θt]
s.t. ct +
q
1− τK
at+1 = at + yt − T (yt).
AIMEt+1 =
tAIMEt + yt
t+ 1
(64)
For s < t, a retired agent’s continuation utility is:
v (at, θt , AIMEs, s) = max
ct,yt,at+1
{ln (ct) + βvt+1 (at+1, θt+1, AIMEt+1, s)}
s.t. ct +
q
1− τK
at+1 = at + b(AIMEs, s).
AIMEt+1 =
tAIMEt + 0
t+ 1
if s ≤ 35 else AIMEt+1 = AIMEt
(65)
Then the intertemporal Euler equation holds,
1
ct
=
βq
1− τK
E[
1
ct+1
] and for workers,
the intratemporal equation holds.
The algorithm follows these steps of the endogenous grid method.
• Set aT+1 = 0, sT+1 = T.
• For each t, if s = t:
1. For given at+1, AIMEt+1, st+1 ∈ {t, t + 1} solve for AIMEt using
12
updating rule of AIME and the Euler equation
2. For given at+1, AIMEt, and st+1 ∈ {t, t+1} solve for ct using the Euler
equation
3. Solve for yt using the intratemporal equation.
4. Set st+1 to the work status that yields higher vt
5. Solve for at using the budget constraint of the workers, ct(at+1, st+1)
and yt(at+1, st+1)
6. Interpolate the policy functions for the missing values at
• For each t, if s < t:
1. For given at+1, AIMEt+1, st+1 ∈ {t, t + 1} solve for AIMEt using
updating rule of AIME and the Euler equation
2. For given at+1,AIMEt, and st+1 = s solve for ct and cs using the Euler
equation
3. Solve for ys using the intratemporal equation at time sand comput
b(AIMEt, s).
4. Solve for at using the budget constraint of the retired ct(at+1, s) and
yt(at+1, s)
5. Interpolate the policy functions for the missing values at
At the end of the algorithm I check that the bounds on allocations are not hit.
4 Estimation of Social Security Function
In 2018 the PIA has 3 brackets42; the first PIA bracket is 90% of the AIME from
$0 to $895. The second is 32% of the AIME above $895 up to $5,397, and the
third is 15% of the AIME above $5,397 up to $10,700 which corresponds to one
twelfth of maximum taxable earnings in 201843. The AIME is calculated using
42Calculation methodology for 2018 can be found at https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-
05-10070.pdf. Historical cutoff points can be found at
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/bendpoints.html
43Note this calculation this yields maximum benefits of $3,041.59, even though according
to the SSA if you were to maximize your AIME in all 35 years your PIA would be $2,788.
This is because the maximum taxable earnings in past years scaled by indexing factors comes
often comes out to less than $128,400 the maximum taxable in 2018. For example, the 2015
maximum taxable is $118,500 with an indexing factor 1.0113001 yielding $119,839.06. A list of
past maximum taxable earnings can be seen at https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc/ and a
list of indexing factors is at https://www.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/awiFactors.cgi
13
the mean of the highest 35 years of income in a person’s life, after scaling by an
index factor to account for inflation.
I use the same variables and survey data (Bureau (2016)) I used when calibrat-
ing productivity. I again narrow to those age 25 to 79, employed (empstat = 1 ),
and use the person weights perwt which indicate how many people in the general
population an observation should represent. To approximate the AIME I simply
use their reported income incwage that year, since reliable and complete data on
lifetime earnings is very difficult to obtain. Like I did for the income function, I
replicate the method in Heathcote et al. (2014) but for Social Security; I calculate
the PIA based on the rules above and estimate the equation
log[PIA(AIME)] = log[λss] + (1− τss)log[AIME]
using OLS on 5.9 million observations (increases to 121.2 million when including
frequency weights), which yielded τss = 0.37. Excluding weights or including those
employed but with positive income did not change results significantly. Those
without income were by default excluded. The regression produces a R2 of 0.94
and a good approximation of the SS benefits function that I use for analytical
reasons. Figure 19 shows the PIA as a function of AIME.
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Figure 19: Primary Insurance Amount as a function of Average Indexed Monthly
Eearnings
5 Estimation of Hump-Shaped Productivity Pro-
file
I calibrate µt using empirical analogs from wage data. In the calibration, {µt}
79
t=25
is interpreted as a deterministic baseline trajectory for productivity, from which
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individuals may deviate. We can take the exponential of both sides and take the
expectation, which yields
E[θt] = E[θt−1e
ǫtµt] = E[θt−1]E[e
ǫt ]µt = E[θt−1]µt
since µt is deterministic and e
ǫt is an independent log-normal variable with mean
1. This reduces the problem of calibrating µt to finding E[θt] and E[θt−1]. Like
De Nardi (2004), I follow the same method as Hansen (1993), which uses approxi-
mate hourly wages, calculated from total annual earnings, as a proxy for individual
productivity, which I denote wi and θi respectively. The mean of hourly wage wt
for individuals of the same age would be a proxy for mean productivity θt of the
sample. But instead of using the smaller Current Population Survey (CPS) from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), I use the larger and more detailed
American Community Survey (ACS) from the U.S. Census Bureau. I specifi-
cally use the most recent 2016 5% dataset which combines and normalizes the
1% datasets of 5 years. Given the framework of the model, I narrow the sample
to those aged 25 and 79 and those indicated to be currently employed, and then
calculate approximate mean hourly wages wt for each age t
θt = wt =
1∑
i:Agei=t
weighti
∑
i:Agei=t
θi1employed{i}weighti
where θi individual productivity is
θi = wi =
1
52
AnnualIncomei
WeeklyHoursi
More specifically, AnnualIncomei is annual wage and salary income earned
from an employer,WeeklyHoursi is usual weekly hours, and weighti is the number
of people in the U.S. person i in the sample should represent in the population. I
use 52 to obtain approximate annual hours since weeks worked is not available in
the 2016 dataset. Table 3 lists variable names and descriptions used.
However, there are two issues I encounter if I were to directly use wt
wt−1
as the µt
values; first, as age increases, representation in the sample and working share both
decrease, leading to volatility in mean wage. Second, ACS is cross-sectional and
cannot account for the theoretical prediction that those with lower wages retire
earlier. To address these issues I instead use a regression approximation of µt
while labor force participation is high and replace later years with extrapolations.
First, I collapse the data set by age so there is one representative observation for
15
Table 3: Estimation of hump-shaped productivity profile
Variable IPUMS name description value
AnnualIncomei incwage annual salary and wages from an employer 0 - 714,000
WeeklyHoursi uhrswork usual hours per week if employed last year
1-98
0 = N/A
99 = 99+
1employed{i} empstat employment status
1 = employed
2 = unemployed
3 = not in labor force
weighti perwt number of people represented by i 1 - 1829
each age, where all variables are the weighted averages across individuals of that
age. Next I calculate wt
wt−1
and denote this w˜t and estimate the equation
w˜ = β0 + β1age+ β2age
2 + β3age
3
for ages where labor force participation is greater than or equal to 20% given
the sample issues above, which turns out to be 70 and under. To obtain the
empirical labor force participation rate and in particular the age when labor force
participation reach 20%, I use PSID data. I exclude those who report having
retired then unretired to make it comparable with the permanent decision in the
model and for simplicity. The top panel of Figure 20 shows the empirical labor
force participation rate and the 20% cut-off.
Using the βˆ coefficients I then calculate the fitted values µˆt and use these
fitted values for ages 71 to 79 and use the original calculated µt values for all
earlier years. I run this regression without weights because µt, not θt is the main
parameter of interest. Also, I am solely interested in finding a baseline trend line
with for productivity with respect to age instead of finding the best fit line for the
entire population, which would weigh the middle of the distribution more. I use
up to a cubic term because the path of w˜t has an inflection point. Using these, I
use value w25 as a baseline and sequentially calculate the predicted values of wt
and plot these with the observed wt values below. The bottom panel of Figure 20
shows the empirical and predicted efficiency profiles.
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Figure 20: Top panel: Empirical labor force participation rate and 20% cut-off.
Bottom panel: hump-shaped productivity profile.
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6 Moments and Properties of Allocations in Base-
line Economy
The following figures illustrate how the baseline economy behaves, when calibrated
as in Table 1. In this case, taxes and retirement benefits are calibrated to the US
status tax and SS system as explained in Section 5.2, and are not set optimally.
Figure 21 plots the means of income and consumption. Figure22 plots the
variance of the logs of output, consumption, and wages, while Figure 23 shows
the variances of output, consumption, and wages. Figure24 plots the mean asset
holdings over the general population, while Figure25 plots the mean assets of
retirees. The labor force participation rates and retirement hazard ratio are plotted
alongside their counterpart in the optimal allocations in Figures 16 and 17.
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Figure 21: Mean output and consumption. Panel A for φ = 0.4 and Panel B for
φ = −0.7.
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Figure 22: Variance of the logs of output, consumption, and wages. Panel A for
φ = 0.4 and Panel B for φ = −0.7.
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Figure 23: Variance of the logs of output, consumption, and wages. Panel A for
φ = 0.4 and Panel B for φ = −0.7.
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Figure 24: Mean asset holdings. Panel A for φ = 0.4 and Panel B for φ = −0.7.
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Figure 25: Mean asset holdings of retirees. Panel A for φ = 0.4 and Panel B for
φ = −0.7.
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